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Local public goods make a city productive and livable. Transportation 
infrastructure, for example, is a public capital input to the city’s production. 
Public schools and healthcare services contribute to urban amenities that make 
the city more livable. The supply of local public goods is affected by the 
incentives faced by the local government who allocates the local fiscal 
revenue. The incentives, in turn, depend on the local government’s preferences 
and the local public finance, which affects the government’s budget constraint. 
This study investigates the incentives of a city government in allocating its 
revenue between public capital investments and public service expenditure in 
a spatial equilibrium model. The model takes into account cross-city factor 
mobility and compensating variation in the price of non-traded goods, which 
respond to changes in local taxes and local public goods.  
We use the open-city model proposed in Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) as our 
point of departure. The city in that model has a traded sector and a non-traded 
sector, each employing labor, private capital and public capital as factor inputs. 
Local consumers (workers) consume goods from both sectors plus local 
amenities, to which the access is free. As the consumer utility level and the 
rate of return on private capital are kept constant by free mobility, the city’s 
wage rate, non-traded good price, population size, as well as outputs and land 
rents, are determined by the level of the public capital and local amenities in 
the city. We then introduce a public sector to the model, to endogenize the 
supply of local public goods. The public sector raises revenue from local taxes 
to finance expenditure on local public goods. We solve the allocation of the 
local budget between investments, which augment local public capital, and 
public services, which raises the level of local amenity, conditioning on the 
objectives of the local government and local tax structure that affects the 
impact public expenditure has on local revenue. 
We consider two types of local taxes: a producer tax on the traded good and a 
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consumer tax on the non-traded good. We label the former as a value-added 
tax (VAT) and the latter as an ad valorem property tax (APT). We show that 
VAT, equivalent to an external demand shock, depresses the wage rate, 
non-traded good price, and city population size, holding the level of local 
public goods constant. The effect of APT is different; it depresses the 
non-traded good price and city size but raises the wage rate. APT makes the 
non-traded good more expensive to consumers, limiting the city size and, 
holding the level of local public goods constant, raising the city’s labor 
productivity. Whereas the composition of the city GDP, in terms of the 
respective shares by the traded and non-traded sectors, is independent of the 
local public goods and unaffected by VAT, APT reduces the share of the 
non-traded GDP. Total land rent in the model equals GDP net of total wage, 
returns to private capital, and tax revenue. Both GDP and total land rent 
decrease with local taxes. 
We employ the model to study issues related to urban performance and local 
public finance reform in China. In the past two decades, cities in China relied 
largely on producer taxes (VAT) and disposal of land for non-traded sector 
uses for public revenue, the property tax (APT) being absent. In addition, local 
officials are often promoted according to their performance in managing local 
GDP growth rather than local public services. We demonstrate that introducing 
APT to diversify the local tax bases can help to rationalize city size, even with 
public revenue held constant. The reduced city population size will raise labor 
productivity and hence wage rate, helping to reverse the declining trend of 
wage share in Chinese GDP in the past decade.  
We further examine whether the opportunity cost of delivering a higher level 
of local amenities in terms of forgone investment in public capital can be 
affected by the structure of local taxes, when local balanced budget is 
maintained and the tax revenue is allowed to increase with concurrent public 
expenditure. The trade-off between the local amenity level and the public 
investment under balanced budget will affect the supply of public capital 
versus public services and hence the urban performance. For the case where 
the average (per capita) cost of public services increases with city population 
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size (due to congestion) when the level of public capital and amenity is held 
constant, we show that the opportunity cost of raising local amenity (via 
increased spending on public services) will be lower if the revenue is raised 
from a combination of VAT and APT instead of from VAT alone. APT 
rationalizes city size for a given level of local public goods. A more 
rationalized city size encourages the supply of public amenity when it lowers 
the cost of public services required to deliver the amenity. In such case, local 
public finance reform to diversify the local tax bases would spur local 
spending on public services as opposed to public investment, thus contributing 
to raising the low consumption share of GDP in China. In addition, the model 
can demonstrate that, when the local government puts more weights on local 
GDP performance as opposed to local amenities, as GDP performance is more 
important for local officials’ career advancement, more local budget will be 
allocated to public investment at the expense of local public services. Our 
model is able to provide a connection between the political incentives of local 
officials and the excessive share of investment in GDP growth in China 
observed in the past decade.  
Finally, we demonstrate that local public finance reform to introduce APT will 
meet political resistance from local governments, who rely on revenue from 
the disposal of land for non-traded sector uses, and from the local residents 
with Hukou, who are (de facto) landlords of the existing homes. The resistance 
arises because APT depresses the non-traded sector share of GDP and land 
rents, hurting an important revenue source for the local government and the 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Fiscal decentralization increases local government competition. There have 
been extensive studies on how local government competition provides various 
fiscal incentives in the US and in many other developed countries. Their 
findings showed that fiscal decentralization would enhance the local 
government’s incentive for improving the welfare of the residents, due to the 
constraints of the “voting with hand” and “voting with feet” mechanisms. 
However, the studies on local government competition in developing countries 
are still rudimentary. The effects of local government competition for policy 
choices would deviate from the findings from developed countries, given the 
different fiscal systems, political institutions and local government’s functions.  
Fiscal decentralization reforms in western countries often provided local 
governments with more complete autonomies in deciding local tax rates and 
expenditures policies. In contrast, local governments in China are restricted 
with little taxation autonomy, while local expenditure autonomy and 
responsibilities are much more than that of developed countries. In addition, 
local governments in China are not elected directly by local residents, who are 
promoted mainly based on GDP of the jurisdiction. This makes the “voting 
with hand” mechanism invalid in China. Given these distinctions between 
China and the developed countries, the effect of local government competition 
resulting from fiscal decentralization in China needs to be further investigated. 
Local government competition in China plays an important role in China’s 
economy (Cheung, 2009). Inter-local government competition in capital 
investments contributes to its capital-intensive, industry-led economic growth 
pattern. For example, government investments account for 40 percent of the 
economic growth over past decades, of which local expenditures took up 
around 70 percent of total expenditures in 1994, and exceeded 80 percent in 




2010. Among the local expenditures, more than 30 percent of fiscal revenues 
were spent on economic development in which the capital construction is 
included. Around 5 percent of fiscal expenditures were allocated to urban 
maintenance and construction expenditure. Average local public service 
expenditure including the education, health care, safety, etc. made up 
approximately 25 percent. In the US, state and local expenditure on public 
services consists of around 47 percent of total spending, while capital 
investment, such as highway, is 5.0 percent, and the utility spending comprises 
6.6 percent (Barnett and Vidal, 2012). 
The government’s expenditure choice is affected by its tax regime. The current 
local tax system of China is dominated with valued-added tax and no 
residential property tax
1
. The value-added tax (VAT) makes up more than 50 
percent of total local tax revenue (Figure C.3.1.2), which indicates that the 
VAT plays a critical role in local tax revenue. The share of VAT in local tax 
revenue is even higher by accounting for the tax rebates. The local 
property-type taxes contribute to less than 10 percent of local tax revenue, 
which are mainly levied on commercial real estates while the residential 
property is exempted from taxation. In contrast to many other countries, 
residential property tax is an important tax source for local public service 
financing. For example, local property tax percentage of total tax revenue is 
around 75 percent in the US, Canada 84.5 percent, British 93 percent and 
Australia 99.6 percent. 
The government’s expenditure choice is also affected by its objective. The 
local government in China is mainly focusing on GDP, because which is used 
to measure the officer’s performance. 
The aim of this study is to revisit the relationship between local tax system and 
local government’s expenditure competition. We examine the incentives of 
local government’s public good choice between public capitals and public 
services. An emphasis will be placed on the comparison between the 
                                                             
1
 see Appendix C for the detailed introduction into China’s fiscal system. 




value-added tax regime versus the residential property tax regime. This study 
will also explore the incentives from local government’s prior objective of 
GDP versus the local resident’s quality of life. 
We use a spatial equilibrium approach to do the analysis, which is based on 
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009). We extend their model to study the effect of taxes 
on urban performance by adding balanced budget constraint and local 
government’s utility from GDP and the quality of life. 
1.2 Findings and Contributions 
Our finding shows that the city size associated with value added tax is larger 
than that with residential property tax in China, which causes local 
government’s incentive to invest more public capitals than provide public 
services, because larger population size induces higher public service 
expenditures and results in a higher opportunity cost in terms of sacrificing 
public capital investment. This result demonstrates that China’s current local 
tax system dominated with VAT and without residential property tax 
contributes to its public expenditure choice in favoring capital investment to 
public service provision. 
We also compare the impacts from these two tax regimes on the housing rental 
price and local wage. Our finding shows that housing rental price is higher but 
wage rate is lower with VAT than residential property tax. This result explains 
the current phenomena of relatively high housing rental price but low local 
wage rate in China’s big cities. 
The analysis of the incentive from local government objective of GDP versus 
the quality of life verifies that the primary objective of GDP accounts for local 
government’s enthusiasm on public capital investment, as opposing to public 
service provision. 
These findings provide significant policy implications for China’s fiscal 




reform. First, given no data available on residential property tax at the present, 
this study adopting the numerical approach is an innovative contribution. 
Second, despite consensus of the GDP objective’s impacts on government’s 
biased expenditure choice in China, few studies have theoretically examined 
this argument. Third, this study suggests a prescription on promoting a 
sustainable economic growth by implementing residential property tax, as to 
counteract the negative impact of the shrinking export demands since the 
global financial crisis in 2008. 
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review on fiscal decentralization. It provides an 
overview on the effects of public goods and the property tax on city 
performance. It also reviews the public goods choice in the local tax system of 
property tax literature. In the last section of this chapter it investigates the 
modeling issue with related to local government’s objectives. 
Chapters 3 establishes the theoretical model, which includes a general model 
and a specific formulation of the general model. The general model provides 
detailed articulation of the model setup and addresses the issue of public goods 
specification in the production and utility functions. The specific form of the 
model is built on Glaeser and Gottlieb(2009) with Cobb-Douglas functions of 
the traded and non-traded goods productions, the household’s and the 
government’s utility. 
Chapter 4 analytically explores the comparative static tax effects on city 
performances in terms of local wage rate, housing rental price, city size, traded 
and non-traded sector’s outputs and land rents, and their ratios, which disclose 
the mechanisms how the taxes affect the city economy. Based on the above 
analyses, it further explores the government’s expenditure incentives for the 
choice between public capital and public service from the tax system and the 




government objective, separately. 
Chapter 5 parameterizes the model to analyze the impacts of residential 
property tax reform on China’s economy. Furthermore, it explores the 
different responses to the residential property tax reform with various types 
of cities. In the end of this chapter, policy implications are drawn upon those 
findings to facilitate the residential property tax reform. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings, contributions and proposes potential 
extensions of this study. 
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Chapter 2  Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
We study the local taxes and government’s incentive for public goods choice. 
The relevant studies in this review include the public goods impacts on city 
performances, the property tax effects on city performance, the government’s 
objectives and the public goods choice. The review of the above issues is 
discussed in sequence in the follows. 
2.2 Public Goods and City Performances 
The effects of public goods on economic performance have been extensively 
examined in the empirical study (for example Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1990 
and 1992). Some of the findings argue that public goods have negative 
impacts on the aggregate economic output, while others find the opposite 
effects. Haughwout (1998) argues that most of these studies conducted in a 
partial equilibrium analysis ignore the feedback effects of the public 
infrastructure, as some of them used the aggregate production function (APF) 
by taking the capital stocks as fixed, which ignores that the capital is free 
mobile, while some others used the aggregate cost function (ACF) that ignores 
the compensating effects of local wages to house prices. The original work of 
Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) study the adjustments of local wages and 
housing prices to varying urban amenity; however, they ignore the productive 
inputs of public capitals in the traded and non-traded goods production. 
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) discuss the impacts of non-traded capitals and 
local amenity on the local wage rate, housing rental price and city size in a 
general equilibrium model. Their model is advantageous in contrast to others 
in accounting for compensating price with both non-traded capitals and local 
amenities. 
Our model built upon Glaeser and Gottlieb’s has the above advantages as 




Glaeser and Gottlieb’s that is a full-fledged model, nevertheless, it overcomes 
the weakness of their model in taking local non-traded capitals and urban 
amenities exogenous. 
2.3 Property Tax and City Performances 
Tax incidence theory addresses who ultimately bears the tax burden, 
accounting for tax effects on equilibrium product and factor prices, which is 
usually the focal point of local public finance. Tax incidence studies generally 
include “differential tax incidence” and “balanced budget incidence.” The 
studies of “differential tax incidence” examine how manipulation of the tax 
regime, given the same tax revenue, directly impacts a city’s performance; the 
“balanced budget incidence” research focuses on how the expenditure choice 
changes depending on the shift of the tax regimes. The major difference 
between the two approaches is that the “differential tax incidence” analysis 
ignores the effect on the expenditures, whereas the “balanced budget incidence” 
analysis accounts for the impacts on the expenditure choice. The “differential 
tax incidence” approach is more appropriate in comparing different financing 
instruments impact on city performances by disentangling the effects from 
public goods. However the “balanced budget incidence” is a better approach 
from a general equilibrium framework’s point of view, which can be utilized 
to analyze the government’s public good choice. The decision regarding which 
approach should be utilized depends on the specific type of issues being 
addressed. 
2.3.1 “Differential Tax Incidence” 
Three views of property tax incidence have been summarized in Zodrow 
(2007): the traditional view, the “benefit tax” view, and the “capital tax” view. 
The traditional and “capital tax” view both agree upon the distortionary 
feature of property tax. 
The traditional view argues that a higher property tax on residential housing 
will result in a higher housing price. Under this view, the burden of taxing the 




housing structure is shifted to the housing consumers, which resembles to the 
“excise tax” effect, because the housing capital is perfectly mobile. 
The benefit view, originating from Tiebout (1956) argues that property tax is a 
non-distortionary tax, because the taxes paid are the user fees for public good 
consumption. This argument, however, when placed in a heterogeneous 
household preference framework, would face the “free riding” problem. 
Residents may consume less housing in the community with better public 
goods. Although in a homogenous household framework, this “free riding” 
problem may not occur. Hamilton (1976) demonstrated that fiscal zoning can 
transform the property tax into benefit tax by keeping the amount of housing 
consumption constant for each resident. However, his view is based on the 
critical assumption that the fiscal zoning is sufficiently precise to control the 
housing consumption to a given amount. 
In contrast to the benefit view, the “capital tax” view developed by 
Mieszkowski(1972) argued that property tax is a distortionary tax, which 
alters the price of housing and consequently, the consumption behavior. This 
“capital tax” view is developed in a number of jurisdictions with differential 
tax rates. It argues that in a nation with a fixed total capital supply, the average 
tax rate on capitals across jurisdictions imposes the depressing effect on the 
returns of capital, which can be seen as “profit tax”. While the differential tax 
rate in individual regions exhibits the “excise tax effect” that any capital tax 
beyond that average tax rate level will be capitalized into local prices born by 
the consumers. Therefore, Zodrow(2007) argues that the “capital tax” view 
can encompass the traditional view and the “benefit view”. 
The “benefit view” is distinct from the “capital tax” view in that the “benefit 
tax” view does not envision the property tax as a real burden, while the 
“capital tax” views property tax as a burden in referring to its “excise tax” 
effect with the average tax rate. They are also differing in that the “benefit tax” 
is studied with a uniform property tax rate, while the “capital tax” view 
focuses on differential tax rates. 
Mieszkowski(1972) found that the tax differentials across jurisdictions would 




lead to the “excise tax effect” which are capitalized into local housing price. 
On the other hand, the average capital return is depressed by the average 
capital tax rate which will not affect the housing price. For the sake of 
convenience, his model abstracted from the expenditure side, although the 
problem of doing so has been mentioned in his paper. Their model assumes 
after-tax wage rate equals across regions as a result of labor mobility. However, 
it is criticized because the real wage rate (or utility) would be different due to 
the differential housing price, which will result in no equilibrium. 
Polinsky and Rubinfeld(1978) studied separately the effects of property tax 
and public goods on housing price and land rent in a spatial model. They 
found that an increase in property tax rate will cause the total-of-tax housing 
price, capital price and wage rate to increase, whereas, the net-of-tax housing 
price and land rent fall. When the public good is increased holding tax rate 
constant, the price of land will increase and the wage rate decreases. 
Brueckner(1981) assumed that labor mobility generates equal utility at 
equilibrium, but the utility level is varied endogenously. This is because the 
impacts of property tax policy on the economy’s reservation utility cannot be 
neglected with only two large communities composing the whole economy. He 
found that the taxing jurisdiction induced a higher gross-of-tax housing price 
and wage rate on one hand, while a lower land rent on the other hand. 
However, their model is limited with the assumption that the government 
spends the tax revenue in a manner that can cancel the income effect of any 
tax change. 
Lin(1986) accounted for the disposal of the residential property tax revenue, 
but he treated it as a lump-sum transfer back to residents; he found that 
property tax reduced the land rent and the net-of-tax housing price, but 
increased the total-of-tax housing price and the wage rate in the taxing 
jurisdiction. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) found that differential property 
tax has an “excises tax” effect consistent with the traditional view of property 
tax incidence, but the property tax in their study refers to taxation on mobile 
capital, hence it is a “capital tax”. 




The studies on property tax effects on city performances, such as house price, 
wage rate and land rents, have focused on different tax bases. Some property 
tax base is mobile capital (e.g. Mieskowski, 1972; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 
1986), another is referred to land rent (or land value), and others consist of 
both land and its improvement (Arnott and MacKinnon, 1977; Polinsky and 
Rubinfeld, 1978; Brueckner, 1981; Lin, 1986). In this study, we focus on the 
residential property tax on both land and its improvements at the uniform tax 
rate, because the property tax that is based on both structure and land can 
address, to some extent, the issue of financing congested public goods. 
According to Henry George, for efficient public good financing, land rent 
should be fully taxed; however, when taking into account the congestion of 
city size with the public good consumption, head tax is required to 
complementing the land tax. The property tax that is based on both structure 
and land can, to some degree, mimic the role of combining head tax and land 
tax. In addition, the property tax is often found favorable in local public 
finance is due to the administratively easy operation for its location-specific 
feature (Wilson, 2003). 
2.3.2 “Balance Budget Incidence” 
Tiebout(1956) argues that residents “shopping” among communities will lead 
to an efficient supply of local tax/public service package. It implies that 
resident locational decisions are affected not only by local taxes, but also by 
local public services. The studies used to examine the efficient local provision 
of public goods often failed to reflect the full spirit of Tiebout by delinking the 
tax revenues and expenditures. For example, the empirical study of 
Oates(1969) and the theoretical study of Polinsky and Rubinfeld(1978) both 
analyzed separately the tax and public good effect on rental price
2
 in a general 
equilibrium model without budget constraint. Lin(1986) accounted for the 
residential property tax revenue as being returned to residents in a lump-sum 
manner. These analyses ignore the feedback effects of the public expenditure 
on the tax bases, hence the tax revenue. 
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 and local wage rate for Polinsky and Rubinfeld(1978). 




The importance of balance budget analysis has been recognized by some 
following scholars. For example, Brueckner(1979) analyzed the public good 
provision efficiency through property tax value maximization under balance 
budget constraint; however, he did not mention that different tax sources may 
favor one type of public good compared to the others. His study is different 
from ours because we consider the different incentives of tax regimes on a 
government’s choice among multiple public goods. In addition, when he 
discussed the tax effects on housing service or wage income, he implicitly 
assumes that the utility is separable in its consumption components, while the 
cost function of production is separable in its inputs, respectively. Therefore, 
when he analyzes multiple public goods, there is a possibility for multiple tax 
rates to correspond to various tax types that satisfy the efficient condition. Our 
study may not be able to achieve the efficient tax level conditions, due to the 
use of a general tax source to finance all three public goods. Wilson (2005) 
analyzed the welfare effect of competition for mobile capital via both capital 
and income taxes. It emphasized the importance of the feedback effect in 
supplying public inputs to firms. Its finding showed that the expenditure 
competition on public inputs improves the resident’s welfare in an open 
economy. These aforementioned studies focused on only one type of public 
good; there are also other studies involving the balanced budget analysis paid 
attention to the composition of the public goods provision. 
Keen and Marchand(1997) studied the impact of tax competition on the 
composition of public goods. Despite fruitful findings from their study, we 
focus only on its analysis on the composition of public goods under a single 
tax regime-capital tax. Local public goods were divided into public capital and 
public service which were financed by the capital tax on private capital. Their 
finding suggested that public capital would be oversupplied relative to public 
service in a non-cooperative equilibrium. However, their model is restrictive, 
because they assume labor immobility. It is argued that with labor mobility, 
the findings could be inconsistent which was testified by Matsumoto (2000). 
His finding showed that capital taxation did not distort the mix of public 
services and public capitals under both labor and capital free mobility, even 




though the overall level of public expenditure was inefficiently low. In 
addition to classifying public good into public capital and public service, some 
studies also only focus on distinguishing public capitals. Matsumoto (2004) 
differentiated public capital into two types: one complementing to immobile 
factor and the other complementing to mobile factor respectively in traded 
good production. His finding suggested that local governments competing for 
capital tax base tend to undersupply both the public inputs. 
In sum, the existing literature of the public good’s choice did not pay enough 
attention to how different tax regimes would affect the composition of public 
goods, especially with respect to the VAT versus residential property tax 
regime. Therefore, this study examines the public capitals versus public 
service choice under the VAT regime in comparison to the APT regime with 
the condition of equivalent revenue and accounting for the feedback effect of 
the public goods. 
2.4 Local Public Goods Choice and Local 
Government’s Preference 
Local government objectives can be described as either altruistic or selfish or a 
conglomeration of both traits. Correspondingly, there are three types of 
literature in treating local government objective functions: one is the 
“benevolent” government, another is the “Leviathan” government, and the 
other is a mixture of the “benevolent” government and “Leviathan” 
government. 
2.4.1 “Benevolent” government 
“Benevolent” government is characterized by the objective of maximizing its 
residents’ welfare. Literature on this type of local government competition has 
achieved different results of welfare effects which can be either 
welfare-improving or welfare-worsening under different settings. The view of 




welfare-improving is supported by the original work of Tiebout. In Tiebout’s 
framework, residents are mobile without taking into account firms; local 
governments competing for mobile residents will provide public goods at 
minimum costs; hence, the equilibrium outcome will be efficient. Following 
Tiebout’s framework, other authors extend the model to analyze local 
governments’ competition for mobile firms, their findings as well support that 
the public goods provision by local government is efficient (White, 1975; 
Fischel, 1975). On the contrary, some literatures support the proposition of 
welfare-worsening tax competition, as Oates (1972) states that  
“The result of tax competition may well be a tendency toward less than 
efficient levels of output of local services. In an attempt to keep taxes low to 
attract business investment, local officials may hold spending below those 
levels for which marginal benefits equal marginal costs, particularly for those 
programs that do not offer direct benefits to local business.”  
Following Oates’ framework, other studies investigating the effects of 
competition for mobile capital support the claim that local government tax 
competition will cause a “race to bottom” (Zodrow and Mieskowski, 1986; 
Wilson, 1986; see Wilson (1999) for a literature review). 
In Tiebout’s framework, the strong assumption is that mobile households are 
well informed and fully reveal their preferences. The “head tax” becomes a 
benefit tax which perfectly fits into the each household’s valuation of the 
public goods. Thus, each resident receives what he pays. Hence, local public 
goods provision in equilibrium is efficient. Literature that study mobile firms 
and obtain the same findings as Tiebout’s often start with the similar 
assumption of perfect information, in which mobile firms are fully informed 
about the costs of public capitals. In the end, each firm received the benefits of 
public inputs same as the costs they valued. 
“Fiscal externalities” is a major concern for local government’s expenditure 
choice, which is induced by the cross-border impacts of one region’s public 
policy on the other regions’ budgets. For example, increasing the capital tax in 




one region will cause capital outflow and thus benefit the other regions by 
increasing their tax base and hence increasing their budget revenues. The 
major departure of the “race to bottom” literature from Tiebout’s lies in their 
treatment of “fiscal externalities”. Tiebout’s literature does not take into 
account the “fiscal externalities” while the “race to bottom” literature does. 
2.4.2 “Leviathan” government 
“Leviathan” government is characterized by the objective of maximizing its 
budget size. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest that local governments 
focus on its own personal interests and may not consider the interest of their 
residents. Self-interested governments have a tendency to overspend. In turn, 
the tax rate will be set too high, beyond which local residents prefer. For this 
reasoning, the tax competition for mobile resources that prevent the local 
governments from over spending could be regarded as increasing its efficiency. 
Alternatively, McLure (1986) supports the stance that tax competition fosters 
welfare-improvement, because tax competition forces local government to 
improve their tax structures. 
2.4.3 Combination of “Benevolent” and 
“Leviathan” government 
The “benevolent” government and “Leviathan” government are two extreme 
cases of local government objective that possess pure altruism or selfishness. 
Some authors addressed this gap by discussing the local government in 
between the social welfare and the personnel rent (Rauscher, 1998; Edwards 
and Keen, 1996). However, the results are obscure because the political rent 
seeking generates the effects that are opposite to that of fiscal externalities. 
Although political rent is taken into account in the model, they are 
exogenously specified and thus fail to take into account the political process. 
In sum, the local governments with the GDP objective have not received 




enough attention. This study examines the effects of local governments’ 
preference of GDP as opposing to quality of life on their public good choice 
between public capital investment and public service supply. This specific 
feature of China’s local government’s enthusiasm for the GDP, as has been 
well-documented, distinguishes this study from many others. 
2.5 Summary 
This study utilized the general spatial equilibrium model to analyze the public 
goods choice under the VAT versus the residential property tax with 
government’s objective of GDP versus the quality of life. It extends 
Rosen(1978), Roback(1982) and Glaeser and Gottlieb(2009) by endogenous 
local non-traded capitals and urban amenities, which are supplied by local 
governments. This extension accounts for the variation of city performances 
from the institution perspective of local tax system and the political incentive. 
Besides, this study can add to the extant literature of fiscal decentralization 
and government expenditure competition with its full-fledged model setup and 
accounting for the endogenous feedback effects of the public expenditures on 
tax revenues. 
Other contributions of this study attribute to the specific institution features of 
China. First, the fiscal incentive analysis focusing on VAT versus APT is 
relatively under explored. Second, the political incentive of GDP measurement 






Chapter 3  An Open Economy Model 
3.1 The Setting of the Urban Economy 
There are many small open economies in the system, referred to “cities”. In 
each city, there are two production sectors: traded goods sector and non-traded 
goods sector (e.g. housing sector). The traded goods sector produces traded 
goods using private capital, public capital and labors. The non-traded goods 
sector produces non-traded goods using similar inputs. Each sector is freely 
entered and perfectly competitive. Producers choose private inputs taking 
public capitals and the prices of product and factor as given. We assume 
resident-workers, who work where they live, to exclude commuting cost. 
Resident-workers have uniform preferences and can freely move between 
cities. Cities are small enough that the reservation utility is exogenous. The 
private capital return is exogenous which is determined in the world market; 
the private capital incomes are assumed not to be reinvested in the city. 
Resident-workers consume local amenities consisting of local natural 
amenities and public services, traded goods and non-traded goods. 
At equilibrium, location equilibrium requires that workers must be indifferent 
between locations when workers receive their reservation utilities; factor 
market clearing requires that the marginal product of labor equals local wage 
rate, and the marginal product of capital receives competitive rate of return; 
product market clearing requires that housing supply equals housing demand. 
These three conditions collectively determine city size, local wage rate, and 
housing prices. 
The traded goods can be traded to exchange for private capitals. Local 
governments supply three public goods referring to public capital T in traded 
goods production (e.g. port), public capital H in non-traded goods production 
(e.g. road), and public service (e.g. health care). Local governments do not 




directly produce the public goods but rather purchase from the private 
producers. All public goods used in production and consumption are not 
directly paid for by user fees or charges. Local public good provision is 
financed by alternative tax regimes: value-added tax (VAT) or ad valorem 
property tax (APT). 
It also assumes that there is an absentee landlord in the model who claims all 
the land rents
3
. These are the residuals of the production output net of the costs 
of private capitals and labor inputs. With this treatment, any profit induced by 
public inputs will be accrued to the landlord; this assures that there will be 
zero profit at equilibrium. 
Since the cities are symmetric in terms of homogenous firms, developers and 
households, a single representative city can be chosen for this analysis with 
city-specific subscripts suppressed. Local government competition in this 
framework is a Nash competition. 
3.1.1 The Firm's Problem 
Each individual firm produces traded goods using private capital (
Tk ), public 
capital T (
Tz ) and labors ( Tl ). Each individual firm's production function is 
( , , )Tj Tj Tjf z k l ; j  denotes the j th individual firm. The private capital is 
purchased in the world market with the exogenous price of r  (interest rate). 
Labor is employed from a competitive labor market with an endogenous local 
wage rate W .  
Public capital T is assumed to be sector specific public input, which is rivalry 
within a firm but can be rivalry or non-rivalry among firms within the industry 
and it is non-excludable. The condition of rivalry within a firm is to ensure 
that given the public capital, each firm’s production is decreasing return to 
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 Later in Chapter 5, this absentee landlord assumption will be relaxed to analyze the 
allocation of incremental land rent in the non-traded sector to provide political 
economic implications on property tax reform. 




scale; hence, firms cannot infinitely increase other inputs to make positive 
economic profits. The identification of the public capital in an industry is not 
essential, because we use the aggregate form of the public capital in the city 
aggregate production function. The proof is as follows. 
For rivalry and non-rivalry public capital T, the aggregate public capital T ( ) 
and the individual firm’s public input has the following relationship, 
  ( 3.1 ) 
The aggregate production function equals the sum of the individual firm’s 
production function. For the rivalry and non-rivalry public capital T, the 
aggregate production function is  , ,f m z m k m lT T T T    and  , ,f z m k m lT T T T   as 
in the follows,  
  ( 3.2 ) 
Using the notation of aggregate public capital T ZT  to replace the sum of the 
rivalry and non-rivalry public capital T inputs, that is m z ZT T   and 
z ZT T , the aggregate function of the traded good production is uniformly 
stated as  , ,Q F Z K LT T T T T . Hence, the specification of the rivalry or 
non-rivalry among firms does not affect the formulation of the aggregate 
production function. 
In the aggregate production function, the total public capital T input  is 
determined by the initial stock ( 0TZ ) and the incremental investment by local 
governments ( TI ); TK  is the aggregate private factor input which equals the 
TZ
1
, for rivalry public capital T
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sum of individual inputs; 
TL  is the total labor input which equals the sum of 
individual labor inputs. The marginal product of each input is decreasing. It is 
assumed that the individual firm uses constant returns to scale production 
technology on all factors. Hence, the aggregate production function is 
decreasing return to scale given that the productivity and public capital are 
fixed. The non-exclusionary feature of public capital justifies the 
government’s provision. 
Traded goods are considered as the numeraire and the aggregate output is 
subject to VAT: 
v . The net-of-tax traded goods price is    ,1 1 1X v vP     , 
and the net-of-tax total output is 
X TP Q . Firms choose private capitals and 
labor inputs to maximize after-tax profits by taking public capital T and prices 
as given. At equilibrium, free entry and the assumption of absentee landlord 
assures that there will be zero profit, because any profit induced by pubic 
inputs will be accrued to the landlords. Firms will receive competitive 
after-tax return of private capital:  X T TP Q K r   . The marginal product of 
labor will equal to local wage rate:  X T TP Q L W   . 
These two conditions can determine the factor demands in terms of net-of-tax 
price, factor prices and total stock of public capital T:  , , ,T T X TK K P r W Z  
and  , , ,T T X TL L P r W Z . Assuming that the agglomeration economies affect 
firm's production in a Hicks-neutral way, such that the relative employment of 
private factors inputs are not changed, the productivity of the traded goods 
sector is then represented with A aN . Hence, the traded goods output 
function is  , , , ,T T X TQ Q P r W Z N , which depends on the net-of-tax product 
price, the factor prices, the stock of public capital T and the city size. 
Since the public capitals are not directly paid through user fees or charges, the 
benefit of the public capitals is accrued to land owners through land rent. Then, 
land rent in the traded goods sector is the residuals of the production output 
net of private capital and labor inputs: 




      , , , , , , , , , ,T X T X T T X T T X TR P Q P r W Z N r K P r W Z W L P r W Z      ( 3.3 ) 
3.1.2 The Builder's Problem 
Individual developers produce non-traded goods (e.g. housing services) using 
three inputs similar to traded goods production: private capitals, public capital 
H and labors
4
. The production also uses constant return to scale technology for 
all inputs. Neglecting the individual production function, step forward to look 
at the aggregate production function, the production function of the non-traded 
good is ( , , )H H H H HQ F Z K L . The non-traded goods price P  is a local price, 
which is endogenously determined by local fiscal conditions. The aggregate 
output of non-traded goods is: ( , , )H H H H HPQ P F Z K L  . 
Developers choose private capital and labor inputs to maximize their profits, 
given public capital H. At equilibrium, private capital will receive the 
competitive rate of return which is determined in the world market: 
 H HPQ K r   , and the marginal product of labor equals to local wage rate: 
 H HPQ L W   . 
From the above two conditions, the private capital demand is determined by 
local non-traded goods price, factor prices and the stock of public capital H: 
 , , ,H H HK K P r W Z . Similarly, labor demand function is  , , ,H H HL L P r W Z . 
The quantity output of non-traded goods depends on the non-traded goods 
price, factor prices and the stock of public capital H:  , , ,H H HQ Q P r W Z ; the 
total value of non-traded goods is:  , , ,H H HPQ P Q P r W Z  . 
In this study, since there is no tax directly levied on developers, the benefit of 
public capital H is fully capitalized into land rent, which assures the zero profit 
of non-traded sector at equilibrium. Non-traded sector land rent is the residuals 
of the non-traded goods output net of the private capital and labor inputs: 
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 Public capital H is similar to public capital T except that it is non-traded sector 
specific. 




      , , , , , , , , ,H H H H H H HR P Q P r W Z r K P r W Z W L P r W Z        ( 3.4 ) 
3.1.3 The Resident-worker's Problem 
Each resident consumes local amenities (  ), traded goods ( Tq ), and 
non-traded goods (
Hq ). The utility function is denoted as  , ,T HU q q . Each 
resident is endowed with one unit of labor and uses it completely in 
production without leisure consumption. The only income source is labor 
income W . Local amenities consist of public service   and natural 
amenities  :     . Public service   is considered as a one-time 
consumption good
5
;   is a natural amenity (e.g. weather). Residents 
purchase traded and non-traded goods to maximize its utility, given local 
amenities. Traded goods price is unity and the non-traded goods rental price is 
P . Since the consumption of non-traded goods is subject to property tax P , 
total of tax housing price is  ' 1 PP P   . The traded goods consumption 
equals  ' ,T Tq q P W . The housing service consumption is  ' ,H Hq q P W . 
Hence, the indirect utility is  ' , ,V P W  . To simplify the analysis, we apply 
the treatment of Wilson (1986) in the utility formation. Two assumptions are 
made: (i) the local amenities are weakly separable from private goods 
consumptions; (ii) the private goods consumptions are homogenous of degree 
one. 
At equilibrium, residents receive reservation utility:
 
 
 ' 0, ,V P W U   ( 3.5 ) 
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 By assuming that public service is a one-time consumption good, it seems that the 
public service provision is unrelated to the previous supply level, however, this is not 
necessary the case, because the incumbent government needs to at least to provide the 
previous level of public service to maintain the population. 





3.1.4 The City Government's Problem 
In this framework where there are many small open cities, all cities initially 
implement VAT, but then, one of the cities switches from VAT regime to APT 
regime. This change of one city’s tax system would have little effect on the 
nation’s reservation utility as well as the exogenous private capital return, 
because there are so many small open cities. The tax regime shift of a single 
city, which causes changes in its local prices and city size, would create a 
negligible impact on the other cities. Hence, its local government takes the 
prices of traded goods and private capitals as exogenous, and chooses public 
goods provision independent of the other city governments’ choices to 
maximize its utility subjected to budget constraint. 
Local government's objective consists of aggregate economic output and the 
quality of life. Local aggregate economic output (GDP) includes both 
net-of-tax traded goods and non-traded goods output and tax revenues by 
applying income approach: 
 X T H v T P HGDP P Q PQ Q PQ         ( 3.6 ) 
The quality of life is represented by local amenities  . Therefore, the utility 
of local government can be denoted with  ,gU GDP  . 
Assuming no depreciation of local public capitals, local government 
investments in public capital T is TI  and public capital H is HI . Therefore, 
the total capital stocks available after local government investments are 
0T T TZ I Z   and 0H H HZ I Z  ; 0TZ  and 0HZ  are the initial capitals. Local 
government supplies public services   to a population of N residents at the 
cost of   ,C N . 




The total expenditure is ( , , ) ( , )T H T HEX I I I I C N    ; the total fiscal revenue 
from mix VAT and APT tax source is ( , , )T H v T P HRV I I Q PQ    . Hence, the 
balanced budget constraint is: 
 ( , )T H v T p HI I C N Q PQ       ( 3.7 ) 
3.1.5 The Equilibrium Outcomes 
The three equilibrium conditions stated at the outset are restated as follows. 
At equilibrium, the labor market is cleared with labor supply equal to the 
demand in both sectors: 
 ( , , , ) ( , , , )T X T H HL P r W Z L P r W Z N     
( 3.8 ) 
Hence, city size is affected by the net-of-tax product prices, the factor prices 
and the stock of local public capitals. 
The non-traded goods market is cleared when the supply of non-traded goods 
meets the demand of non-traded goods. Given total non-traded goods demand 
is Hq N , and non-traded good supply is  , , ,H H HF F P r W Z , non-traded 
goods market clearing condition will be H Hq N Q  . Given individual’s 
non-traded goods demand is  ' ,H Hq q P W , the non-traded goods market 
clearing condition is restated as: 
    ' , , , ,H H Hq P W N F P r W Z   ( 3.9 ) 
Residents achieve location equilibrium when they receive the reservation 
utility: 
  ' 0, ,V P W U   ( 3.10 ) 




These three conditions together can solve out equilibrium city performance in 
terms of the local wage rate, the non-traded goods price and the city size with 
respect to the local tax rates, the exogenous prices and the public goods. 
  , ,1, , , ,v P T HP P r Z Z    
( 3.11 ) 
  , ,1, , , ,v P T HW W r Z Z    ( 3.12 ) 
  , ,1, , , ,v P T HN N r Z Z     
( 3.13 ) 
Note: The land market equilibrium is not discussed explicitly here, but simply 
assumed that it will adjust until equilibrium is achieved. Land tax is not 
included in the city performance, because it affects in the land market. 
3.2 The Cobb-Douglas Specification 
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) accounts for cross-city variations of housing 
rental price, wage rate and city size by local non-traded capitals and natural 
amenity in a spatial equilibrium model. Our study has a similar model setup as 
theirs, which also has the traded goods sector, the non-traded goods sector, 
and the households. In their model, the production and consumption activities 
are in a specific form of Cobb-Douglas. This specific formulation has the 
advantageous to analyze analytically the local non-traded capitals and natural 
amenity’s impacts on city performance. 
Their model has the two production sectors using inputs similar to ours: 
non-traded capital, private capital and labor.. However, we depart from their 
model in the interpretation of the two local non-traded capitals in the 
production functions. In their model, non-traded capital in traded goods 
production is simply a public capital other than land, while non-traded capital 
for non-traded goods production is suggested to be interpreted as land input. 
We reinterpreted the non-traded capitals in both sectors as closely related to 
land, which are seen as public capital investments to convert the agricultural 




land to nonagricultural land for production uses. This interpretation of land as 
public capital investment is not seen often in the literature. For succinctness, 
the land input is suppressed in the production function and represented by the 
public capitals. 
The household also consumes the three goods alike to ours, except the 




Besides these similarities and differences, one important extension of their 
study is that we add local governments, which endogenizes the local public 
capitals and public service provision. 
The following restates the Glaeser and Gottlieb’s model but modifications are 
made when necessary. 
3.2.1 The Firm, the Builder and the Resident 
Firm's production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with constant 
return to scale with all inputs at the individual firm level given productivity: 
   1 1, ,f z k l Az k lTj Tj Tj Tj Tj Tj
   





 Traded goods sector productivity with agglomeration economies N  
TZ  The public capital T input for traded goods production 
TK  The private capital input for traded goods production 
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 In our model, local governments supply three public goods corresponding to the 
two non-traded capitals and the local amenities in Glaeser and Gottlieb's model: (1) 
public capital T for traded good production, (2) public capital H for housing service 
production, and (3) local amenities for resident's consumption. 
 1 1( , , )T T T T T T TF Z K L AZ K L
   
A aN




TL  Labor input for traded goods production 
   The capital share in traded goods production 
1    The labor share in traded goods production 
   The public capital share in total capital for traded production 
1    The private capital share in total capital for traded production 




The sector land rent from the traded goods sector is:  
  ( 3.16 ) 
The aggregate production function of non-traded goods is: 
    
1 1
, ,F Z K L HZ K L
H H H H H H H
   
   
( 3.17) 
Where 
H   Non-traded goods sector productivity 
HZ  The public capital H input for non-traded goods production 
HK  The private capital input for non-traded goods production 
HL  Labor input for non-traded goods production 
   The capital share in non-traded goods production 
1    The labor share in non-traded goods production 
   The public capital H share in total capital for non-traded production 
1    The private capital share in total capital for non-traded production 
The aggregate output of non-traded goods is: 
 1 1
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    
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( 3.18 ) 
The non-traded sector land rent is: 
   ( 3.19 ) 





 Urban amenity consist of public service   and natural amenity   
Tq  Traded goods consumption 
Hq  Non-traded goods consumption 
   Household preference for traded goods consumption 
The expenditure on traded goods consumption equals . The 
expenditure on non-traded goods subjected to property tax ( ) equals: 
, where  is total-of-tax non-traded good rental price 
. Residents have a reservation utility  which is exogenous. 
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3.2.2 The City Government 
(1) Government Utility 
We add the local government’s problem. The city government's utility 






   The weights assigned to GDP 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
 Urban amenity consist of public service   and natural amenity   
Eq.(3.6) The calculation of GDP is simplified with the specific form as  
  1GDP PQ QP H T     ( 3.23 ) 
(2) Budget Function 
To specify the budget function, we need an assumption of the public service 
expenditure function. 
Edwards(1990) provided a detailed analysis on the specification of the public 
goods congestion cost function. His study summarized 5 types of congestion 
function used in the literature: the decreasing marginal congestion, the 
increasing marginal congestion, the decreasing and increasing congestions 
depending on the parameter values, the generalized congestion function that 
encompasses that above three functions, and the last one further extends the 
fourth type to an unconditional one. Some studies, for example, Brueckner 
(2011), argues that the public service is perceived to have increasing shared 
  1,gU GDP GDP
   
   




benefits for each individual when the city size is not in excess of the optimal 
size. On the other hand, exceeding that optimal level will induce congestions. 
In this study, we adopt the specification of the public service congestion cost 
function as decreasing and increasing with respect to city size. This is different 
from the third and fourth model in Edwards’s study, because we use a single function 
encompassing both the decreasing and increasing features, while his identifies these 
feature using subsection functions. The cost of providing the public service is: 
   ( 3.24 ) 
The public service  is a one-time consumption good and subject to 
congestion.  is the resource cost of producing public service, which 
indicates the production cost of  by the private producer
7
.  is the 
congestion induced by city size, while the city size depends on the tax regimes 
and public goods choice.  denotes publicness of the public service. The 
higher value of , the lower publicness of the public service, because more 
congestion cost is induced. If , then  is a pure public good insulating 
from congestion cost; if , then, the public service expenditure is subject 
to congestion. 
According to the cost function of public service (Eq.(3.24)), the average cost 
of public service is . The first order condition is: 
   ( 3.25) 
The second order condition is: 
   ( 3.26 ) 
                                                             
7
 It can assume that the public service production utilizes private capital inputs in the 
form: , government pays private producer dollars: .  
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Hence, the average cost of public service with respect to city size is a U-shape. 
The feature of the public service expenditure function is illustrated in Figure 
3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1 Minimum-average-cost city size 
Note: 
*
1N   is the min-AC city size when MC=AC;
* * b
AC MC e    is the average 
cost and the marginal cost at min-AC city size; 0
b
MC    is the marginal cost at 
0N  ; the average cost at 
*
2N  is 2.718
2 * *b
e e AC AC      
The marginal cost of the public service expenditure is  , bMC N Ne    . 
The minimum-average-cost (min-AC) city size is achieved at the marginal 
cost equals the average cost  (Figure 3.1). Therefore, the minimum 
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Figure 3.1 shows that the feasible area that provides incentive for government 
to increase public service expenditure is , because within this range, 
the average cost is decreasing as city size increases, although the marginal cost 
increases; beyond this point, there will be disincentive for government to 
increase city size. 
This implies that, a larger city size that exceeds the min-AC city size will 
induce congestion cost and cause disincentives for local government to 
provide public service. 
After specifying the public service expenditure function, the explicit budget 
function is 
   
( 3.27 )
 
3.2.3 The Equilibrium Outcomes 
Using the above specified Cobb-Douglas functions, the equilibrium city 
performance is obtained as follows, 
   ( 3.28 ) 
   ( 3.29 ) 
   ( 3.30 ) 
Eq.(3.28), (3.29) and (3.30) report the equilibrium local wage rate, rental price 
and city size respectively. ,  and  are constant terms which depend 
on the parameters in the production function and household preferences
8
. It 
shows that in contrast with Glaeser and Gottlieb, local wage rate, rental price, 
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 W , P  and N  are different from Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) without having the 
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    because they are included in the tax terms. The analysis 
won’t be affected with these differences. 
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and city size depend on the two public capitals (  and ), the public 
service ( ), and three tax terms( , , and ). The coefficients of the 
last three terms on the right hand side of each equation shows the productivity 
shock ( , , ), the housing supply shock ( , , ), and the 
amenity shock ( , , ) on city performances, which are presented in 
Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Spatial equilibrium city performance 
Equation parameters 











The effects of these three shocks are the same as that in Glaeser and Gottlieb, 
which are stated in the follows. 
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(1) The Productivity Shock 
Under the condition of diseconomies bigger than agglomeration economies 
( ), the productivity shock has positive effects on all city performances: 
local wage rate ( ), rental price ( ), and city size ( ), because 
the productivity shock increases the labor productivity and attracts more 
movements of labor into the city, which drives up the housing rental price until 
the housing rental price is high enough to offset the benefit from higher labor 
productivity. 
(2) The Housing Supply Shock 
The housing supply shock depresses housing price ( ), local wage rate 
( ), but enhances city size ( ), because more housing supply 
undermines the housing rental price, which increases the welfare of resident as 
the consumption possibility frontier is expanded; hence, more immigrants are 
attracted into the city, which decreases the marginal product of labor and cause 
it to move until their utility has been restored to the reservation level. 
(3) The Amenity Shock 
Local amenities shock increases housing prices ( ) and city size 
( ), but depresses the local wage rate ( ), because better local 
amenities will attract more people, who will “bid” up the housing rental price; 














Chapter 4  The Effect of Taxes on 
Equilibrium Outcome and Public 
Expenditure Choice 
The tax effects on city performances, including local wage rate, housing rental 
price and city size, are discussed analytically in this chapter. The specific 
Cobb-Douglas form of the theoretical model allows us to analytically identify 
the direct tax effects. This comparative static analysis can provide some useful 
insights on how VAT affects differently the city performances in comparison 
to APT by disentangling the effects from public goods. We also extend the 
analysis to the equilibrium traded and non-traded good outputs and land rents. 
In addition, this chapter investigates local government’s public goods choice 
incentive by examining the budget constraint and the government objectives, 
separately. The tax incentive is examined by fixing the government’s 
preference, while the incentive of government objective is analyzed by fixing 
the budget constraint to the VAT regime. The production possibility frontier 
(PPF) of the balanced budget is investigated to explore the incentive of 
different tax regimes. The government’s preference effect is to be examined 
via its utility using similar approach. 
4.1 Taxes and Housing Rental Price, Wage 
and City Size 
The tax terms in Eq. (3.28), (3.29) and (3.30) are: 
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As shown in Eq.(4.1), the effect of VAT on city performance depends solely on 
the productivity shocks ( ) while the effect of property tax is interactive 
with the amenity shock ( ), productivity shock ( ), and the housing supply 
shock ( ), which are illustrated in the following matrix: 
 
    
( 4.2 ) 
 
The middle term of the equation (between the second and the third equal 
marks) shows the interaction of the tax effects with the three shocks. The 
outcomes of the interactions are shown in the last term. The first column 
matric of the last term presents the effects of VAT on local wage rate, house 
rent, and city size orderly. The second column matric depicts the APT’s 
effects. 
4.1.1 VAT Effects 
The effect of VAT is negative on housing rental price, local wage rate and city 
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Figure 4.1 VAT and housing rental price, wage, and city size 
Note: 
The labor demand curve D and the labor supply curve S intersect at A, which is the 
original city status in terms of housing rental price, city size and wage rate at P, N, 
and W. As VAT is imposed, labor demand curve shifts to the left and the new labor 
market equilibrium is achieved at B, which decreases the housing rental price, city 
size and wage rate to P’, N’, and W’. 
Figure 4.1 shows that VAT decreases the local wage rate, the housing rental 
price and the city size. The intuition is that given public goods, VAT acts as a 
negative external shock, which decreases the return of traded goods output. 
This output effect instantly induces a lower marginal product of labor in the 
traded goods sector; consequently, labor will move to a local non-traded goods 
sector. As the labor supply to the non-traded goods sector increases, the 
marginal product of labor in the non-traded goods sector decreases while that 
(the total-of-tax wage rate) in the traded goods sector increases; this 
movement will stop when the wage rates in the two sectors are equal. At 
equilibrium, the wage rate is reduced relative to the no-tax equilibrium. From 
a production cost's point of view, the labor cost has to decrease in order to 
breakeven, given that the competitive rate of return of private capital is 
exogenous. 
From the demand side, as the local wage rate decreases, households will in 















housing rental prices will decrease and the housing developer must adjust by 
employing less factor inputs until it receives the competitive rate of return of 
private capital. Since the labor demand is decreased in both traded goods 
sector and non-traded goods sector, the city size will shrink. An alternative 
interpretation is that housing rental prices must decrease with the reduction of 
local wage rate in order to maintain the exogenous reservation utility in this 
small open-economies framework. 
4.1.2 APT Effects 
The residential property tax has negative effects on housing rental price and 
city size, but positive on local wage rate. Figure 4.2 diagrammatically explores 
these effects.  
 
Figure 4.2 APT and housing rental price, wage and city size 
Note: 
The labor demand curve D and the labor supply curve S intersect at A, which is the 
original city status in terms of housing rental price, city size and wage rate at P, N, 
and W. As APT is imposed, labor supply curve shifts to the right and the new labor 
market equilibrium is achieved at C, which decreases the housing rental price and city 















For residential property tax, its effect on housing rental price and city size is 
negative. The effect on local wage rate is positive. The property tax acts as a 
negative labor supply shock, which increases the total-of-tax price of housing 
service. The cost of living is then increased and will drive out the resident 
workers since the reservation utility can be obtained elsewhere. Consequently, 
the city size will be reduced and the demand for housing service is depressed.  
As labor supply decreases, the marginal product of labor will increase. As the 
total demand for housing service decreases due to the higher total-of-tax 
housing price, the market price of housing service (net-of-tax housing rental 
price) will also decline. 
The labor outflow will not terminate until local wage rate increases enough to 
compensate for the total-of-tax housing rental price in order to restore the 
reservation utility. Hence, equilibrium is achieved at a smaller city size, higher 
local wage rate, and lower net-of-tax housing rental price, despite the 
total-of-tax housing rental price being higher than the initial rental price when 
no tax is imposed. 
Claim #1 VAT decreases local wage rate, housing rental price and city size; 
residential property tax decreases housing rental price and city size, but 
increases local wage rate. 
4.1.3 Taxes and Sector Outputs 
After obtaining the equilibrium city profile, the equilibrium traded and 
non-traded good outputs:  and  can be obtained as follows: 
  ( 4.3 ) 
 
 
( 4.4 ) 
Where, 
TQ HPQ
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Eq.(4.3)-(4.4) show that the two equilibrium outputs also depend on the 
production technology, resident-worker's preferences, the tax regimes, and the 
three public expenditures, which exhibit a similar form to that of city size, 
local wage rate, and housing rental price. The marginal effect of each public 
good on traded goods output (or the VAT tax base) is detected to be equal to 
the non-traded goods output (or the APT tax base): the marginal effect of 
public capital T equals  , public capital H is  , and public service 
is , which indicates that given exogenous tax rates, the relative size of the 
tax bases is independent of the public goods mix and proportionally fixed. It 
implies that the incentive for public good choices derived from VAT does not 
differ from APT in terms of each public good’s marginal effects on tax 
revenues. The intuition is that the freely mobile capital and labor will ensure 
the equalization of marginal benefit of each public good across sectors when it 
reaches equilibrium. 
Therefore, the major distinctions of the two outputs depend on the tax regimes 
as well as the production technology and household preference, which are 
presented in the constant terms. 
The following analyses of this section will investigate the direct effect of the 
taxes on the traded and non-traded goods output, land rent, and their ratio. 
(1) Taxes and Traded Goods Output 
From Eq.(4.3) and Eq.(4.4), the marginal tax effect on traded and non-traded 
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goods output with respect to VAT, respectively, 
  ( 4.5 ) 
  ( 4.6 ) 
Since the constant terms in Eq.(4.5) (Appendix A for proof) and (4.6) are 
negative: 
  1 1 1
1 0
M
   
    and 
  1 1 1
0
M
   
  , VAT has negative effects on 
both traded and non-traded good outputs. 
(2) Taxes and Non-traded Goods Output 
From Eq.(4.3) and Eq.(4.4), the APT effects on traded and non-traded good 
output is 
 ( 4.7 ) 
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( 4.8 ) 
Both outputs are negatively related to APT. These findings are similar to that 
with respect to VAT. 
(3) The Non-traded to Traded Goods Output Ratio 
Since the marginal effects of each public good on non-traded goods are the 
same as those on traded goods, the ratio of the non-traded goods to traded 
goods depends on only the tax regimes and the production technology and the 
household preference, denoting the ratio as 
  ( 4.9 ) 
Then, the non-traded to traded goods output ratio is 
   ( 4.10 ) 
The marginal tax effect on the non-traded to traded goods output ratio under 
VAT regime ( ) is 
  ( 4.11 ) 
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Eq.(4.11) shows that the non-traded to traded goods output ratio is decreasing 
with VAT, which implies that VAT decreases non-traded goods output faster 
than that of traded goods output. Hence, the non-traded goods sector is more 
impacted by taxation than the traded goods sector. According to the tax 
incidence theory, the tax burden is higher for the less mobile sectors (factors). 
The non-traded goods sector, which is less mobile than the traded sector, will 
bare more of the tax burden. 
The marginal tax effect on the non-traded to traded goods output ratio under 
APT regime ( ) is 
  ( 4.12 ) 
From Eq.(4.12), it is evident that the non-traded to traded goods output ratio is 
decreasing with APT. The reasoning is similar as that with respect to VAT: the 
non-traded goods sector is more affected by taxation than traded goods sector. 
Despite that both VAT and APT decrease the non-traded goods output more 
than the traded goods output, the relative strength of the tax effects on the 
output ratio is ambiguous 
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    
 
       
 
, 
because the VAT effects on the non-traded to traded goods ratio is at a constant 
rate, while the APT effects vary with the initial tax level. 
At a higher level of initial APT, the marginal effect of the ratio with respect to 
APT is lower. In this case, the APT will decrease the non-traded to traded 
goods output ratio at a lower rate  
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.  
When the initial APT equals zero, the APT decreases the non-traded to traded 
goods output ratio at the fastest rate. In this circumstance, the marginal VAT 
effect is smaller than that APT 
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, hence 
the APT depresses the non-traded goods more than the traded goods output. 
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Claim #2 Given public goods, both VAT and APT have negative impacts on 
traded and non-traded goods outputs. The ratio of the non-traded to traded 
goods outputs is independent of the public good mix in the city, but is 
negatively related to both VAT and APT. 
4.1.4 Taxes and Land Rents 
(1) Taxes and Traded, Non-traded Land Rents 
From Eq.(3.16) and Eq.(3.19), the marginal tax effect of VAT on traded and 
non-traded land rent, respectively, is 
   ( 4.13 ) 
   ( 4.14 ) 
Eq.(4.13) shows that VAT affects the traded sector land rent through the direct 
effect as well as the indirect effect which acts through traded goods output. 
Eq.(4.14) shows that VAT affects the non-traded land rent mainly by its 
indirect effect on non-traded goods output, where the direct effect does not 
play a role. The results show that the marginal effect of VAT on traded land 
rent is equal to that on non-traded land rent. This implies that VAT decreases 
the traded and non-traded land rent at the same rate. 
The marginal tax effect on traded and non-traded land rent under the APT 
regime, respectively, is 
   ( 4.15 ) 
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   ( 4.16 ) 
Eq.(4.15) and Eq.(4.16) show that the marginal tax effect of APT on the sector 
land rent is due to the indirect effect via its effect on the traded and non-traded 
goods output. From Claim#2, APT has negative impacts on both traded and 
non-traded goods output; it indicates that their land rents are decreased by 
APT. 
(2) The Non-traded to Traded Land Rent Ratio 
The non-traded land rent to traded land rent equals 
  ( 4.17 ) 
Therefore, the ratio of non-traded to traded land rent is not affected by VAT 
but instead decreased with APT. 
Claim #3 Given public goods, both VAT and APT depress traded and 
non-traded sector’s land rents, but the ratio of non-traded to traded land rent 
is not affected by VAT despite being negatively related to APT. 
4.2 Taxes and the Choice of Public Investment 
and Service Spending under Balanced Budget 
The expenditure on public service is . The marginal cost of the 
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Using that relationship, linearizing the public service expenditure at the base 





( 4.19 ) 
Hence, Eq.(4.19) shows that the public service expenditure consists of (i) the 
resource cost of supplying total city population with public service 
, and (ii) the incremental congestion cost as a result from 
increased city size . Furthermore, 
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   measures the congestion level, as shown in the difference 
between AC curve and MC curve in Figure 3.1.  
If 1 0
0
N   , then the initial city size is at a min-AC level, no congestion 
cost will be induced as the city size increases. If 1 0
0
N    , then the city 
size is too small in comparison to the min-AC level, and the scale economies 
are under explored; if 1 0
0
N   , then the city size is too large relative to the 
min-AC city size which induces the congestion. 
To illustrate the opportunity cost of supplying public service in terms of 
sacrificing public capitals under different tax regimes, we linearize the 
balanced budget using Eq.(3.28)-(3.30). The linearized balanced budget 
equation can be stated as,  
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  ( 4.20 ) 
Dividing both sides of the balanced budget equation (Eq.(4.20)) with initial 
revenue 
0RV  yields, 
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   The share of initial public capital H stock in initial tax revenue 
4 0
a N   The congestion level 14a    
Eq.(4.21) determines the opportunity cost of the public service expenditure in 
terms of sacrificing public capital.  is the share of the initial public service 
expenditure in fiscal revenue and 14a   represents the congestion level, while  
 and  are the initial public capital T and H stock share in initial fiscal 
revenue respectively. It shows that 2a  and 3a  are not affected by the 
changing of the tax regime with the equivalent initial revenue approach, while 
1a  and 4a  vary with the tax regime via the city size. 
In the left hand side of Eq.(4.21), 1 1a  shows the initial fiscal surplus, which 
1a
2a 3a




varies with different tax regimes. This represents the income effects of 
taxation. The different tax regimes are also reflected in the right hand side of 
Eq.(4.21) in . This shows the substitution effects of taxation. As the income 
effect scales the public capitals and public services at the same rate, the major 
mechanism shifts local government’s incentive between public capitals and 
public service is determined by the substitution effects. This is depicted in 
Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 The PPF shifts with different tax regimes 
Note: 
Under the Tax1 regime, local government’s public goods choice is A; under the Tax2 
regime, the choice is B. Tax1 has a smaller PPF(Production Possibility Frontier) than 
Tax2 due to the larger city size with Tax1 than with Tax2. The substitution effect of 
Tax1 causes government to spend more on public capital investment than public 
service, as opposing to Tax2. 
There are two different tax regimes: Tax1 and Tax2. Assuming Tax1 has a 
larger city size than Tax2, Tax1 has a steeper PPF than Tax2 under the 
condition of the equivalent initial tax revenues, as shown in Figure 4.3. The 
substitution effect incentivizes local government to choose more public capital 
investment rather than public service provision with Tax1 in comparison to 












sacrificing public capital is associated with a larger city size. 
Claim #4 The opportunity cost of supplying public service in terms of 
sacrificing public capital is higher with a larger city size. 
4.3 The Government Preference and the 
Choice of Public Investment and Service 
Spending 
Local government’s utility function can be restated in ln form as follows: 
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According to Eq.(3.23) and Eq.(4.10), GDP can be restated as  
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           ( 4.23 ) 
From Eq.(4.22) and Eq.(4.23), the marginal rate of substitution between public 
capital
TZ and public service  : 
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( 4.24 ) 
Similarly, the marginal rate of substitution between public capital HZ and public 
service  : 
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( 4.25 ) 










Figure 4.4 Local government’s preference and public good choices 
Note: 
The ln linear utility curve Utility (
1 ) has a higher weight on GDP than the utility 
curve Utility (
2 ). The public expenditure choice with Utility ( 1 ) is A and that with 
Utility (
2 ) is B. The choice of public capital investment with A is more than that 
with B. 
Figure 4.4 shows the impact of local government’s preferences on public good 
choices. With the weight of 
1  on GDP, the local public good choice is A; 
with the weight of 
2  on GDP, the local public good choice is B ( 1 2  ). 
The public capital investment with A is more than that with B. It implies that 
when local assigns more weights on GDP, the public expenditure on public 
capital T or H will be higher than public service.  
The intuition is straightforward. By increasing the weights on GDP, it will 
increase the marginal utility of GDP. Hence, the marginal utility with respect 
to the factor inputs of GDP will increase. As a result, public capital becomes 
more valuable which requires a greater amount of public service to exchange 
for public capital to achieve the same utility. In sum, as the weights of GDP 














Claim #5: If more weights local government puts on GDP, more will be spent 
on increasing public capitals (either
TZ  or HZ  ) than public service  . 
4.4 Summary 
The study examined the comparative static tax effect on local wage rate, 
housing rental price and city size. The finding has shown that VAT depressed 
all the city performances, while APT depressed the housing rental price and 
city size, but enhanced the local wage rate. 
This finding is consistent with Polinsky and Rubinfeld(1978)’s finding that 
property tax increases local wage rate and the total-of-tax housing price, while 
decreases the net-of-tax housing price and land rent. While their city is similar 
to Muth’s model, in contrast, we did not account for transportation cost and 
the shifting of the land boundary for different uses. In addition, we are able to 
determine the city population changes with the tax rate while they did not. The 
analytical strategy of our study in this section is similar to his in that we 
discuss the tax price elasticity of the city performance given public goods. 
It is also consistent with the finding of Lin (1986) that property tax increases 
local wage rate and the total-of-tax of housing rental price. Our model shares 
several features resembling Lin(1986), although there are distinctions between 
ours. The similarity is that we conduct the property tax incidence in a general 
equilibrium with both mobile capital and labor. We are differing in that his 
model assumes finite number of cities, in which the private capital return is 
determined in the nation’s market. As a result, the property tax induces the 
reduction of private capital return in his study. We assume many smaller open 
cities, such that the number of the cities is large enough that we can ignore the 
fiscal externalities on other cities. This assumption also warrants that the 
property tax imposition did not affect the private capital return, because the 
private capital return is exogenously determined in the world market. We feel 




that our model is more realistic because the current capital market is open and 
the private capital is freely traded in the world market. Our model also differs 
from Lin’s model in that our model incorporates public inputs in both traded 
and non-traded good production function, while his model did not. 
It also found that both VAT and APT depress the non-traded to traded goods 
output and its ratio. In addition, both taxes depress the traded and non-traded 
sector land rents, but VAT does not affect the non-traded to traded sector land 
rent ratio, while APT depresses the ratio of non-traded to traded land rent 
ratio. 
This study also investigates the opportunity cost of public service provision 
under the condition of equivalent initial tax revenue for the two tax regimes. It 
found that the differential incentive of the tax regime was mainly driven by its 
impacts on the city size. The higher the larger city size associated with the tax 
regime, the smaller the incentive to provide public service relative to public 
capital investment. 
Finally, the incentive of supplying public service is also affected by local 
government’s preference of economic development versus the quality of life. 
The analytical result shows that the more weights local government assigns to 
economic development, the greater the incentive for public capital investment 





Chapter 5  A Simulation Analysis of 
China’s Urban and Local Public 
Finance Reform 
5.1 China’s Institution Background 
Before 1978, China was a highly centralized and planned economy. Local 
revenues and public services were provided mainly by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) through profit remittances. The market reform in 1978 caused a 
decrease in SOEs profits, due to the gradual product price marketization and 
the competition from non-state enterprises. Hence, to accommodate the 
multi-ownerships of economic activities and increase the fiscal revenue, the 
“fiscal contracting system” reform in 1980s restored the tax-based revenue 
system
10
 and decentralized the revenue sources to local governments. 
Value-added tax (VAT) was introduced for pilot-experiment in Shanghai in 
1981, which was then spread out to the rest of the country from 1982 onwards. 
In 1985, the VAT (turnover tax) contributed to 46.72 percent of the total tax 
revenue; the ratio continued to increase to 52.84 percent in 1988
11
. The local 
government budgetary revenue relied mainly on VAT. This “fiscal contracting 
system” reform caused central government revenues to decrease, since the 
local government had a tendency to avoid sharing the fiscal revenue with 
central government by shifting the tax bases to extra budget. Hence, in order 
                                                             
10
 Many categories of taxes were implemented between 1949 and 1952, but later 
from 1953 to 1978 the taxes were abolished as a result of simplification of the tax 
system led by the “leftist” theory, which states that socialism needed not taxation (See 
Appendix C for detailed presentation of the China’s fiscal system evolution). 
11
 Data on turnover tax can only be obtained from 1985 in China Financial Yearbook. 
The calculation here is based on the broader definition of VAT encompassing the 
turnover tax on goods (product tax), turnover tax on services (business tax) used at 
that time in China, because VAT at this time is not strictly defined and later reforms 
replaced the turnover tax with VAT. 





to recoup the central tax revenue, the “tax sharing system” was initiated in 
1994. 
The “tax sharing system” assigns shares of VAT revenue between central and 
local government at the ratio 3:1. Consequently, central government’s fiscal 
revenue shares about 60 percent of total fiscal revenue. However, in order to 
gain support from the local governments for this “tax sharing system” reform, 
20 percent of the total fiscal revenue was transferred back to the local 
government. The principle transfers come from the VAT rebates. The VAT 
rebate consists of two parts. The first one is a lump-sum transfer that aims to 
preserve the revenue at level of 1993. The second one is a growth rebate at 30 
percent rebate rate based on the growth of VAT
12
. As the revenue grows 
quickly, the relative size of the lump-sum transfer is smaller and the growth 
rebate becomes dominant in tax rebate, which indicates that VAT tax becomes 
a pro-growth tax. Hence, despite local budgetary revenue share decreasing, the 
role of VAT in local budgetary revenue remains critical after accounting for 
the tax rebates. 
The major property-type taxes included the Urban Real Estate Tax, Land Use 
Tax and Real Estate Tax, which were implemented in 1951, 1986 and 1988, 
respectively. The Urban Real Estate Tax was levied on foreign enterprises and 
individuals, but was abolished in 2009. The Land Use Tax was levied based 
on land areas at a rate ranging from 0.3-10 yuan/m
2
. Real Estate Tax was 
levied mainly on domestic ownership of housing property, and exempted for 
residential housing. The smaller tax bases, in addition to the lower tax rate 
together account for the limited share of property-type tax in local tax revenue. 
The property-type tax revenue makes up less than 10 percent of local tax 
revenue. Residential property tax has been a major source of local tax revenue 
in many other countries; however, it has not been formally enacted in China. 
                                                             
12 
The criteria of the transfer of VAT rebate bases on two formulas: one is the 100 
percent lump-sum transfer according to the revenue level in 1993, the aim is to 
maintain the at least no-worse-than the level its expenditure in that year; the other is 
the transfer of 30 percent of the growth of VAT applicable to the year after 1994(see 
Lin (2011) for a detailed illustration of the VAT rebate system). 





The expenditure responsibilities were financed by the central governments 
during the planned economy and the local government plays its role as an 
agent of the central government to implement the designated expenditure plan. 
The “fiscal contracting system” in 1980s decentralized the public goods 
supply as well as the financing responsibilities to local governments. A local 
government’s expenditure responsibilities include not only the local public 
service provisions but also the local economic developments. Urban 
maintenance and construction is an exclusive responsibility of local 
government. Although the public services such as education, health care, and 
social security are shared responsibilities by the central and local government, 
the local government is responsible for a majority share. For example, in 2003, 
the share of central to local expenditure in health care is 3:97, education is 
8:92, and social security is 11:89 (Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao, 2011). These 
expenditure responsibilities of the local government were not reduced as 
which should have been in corresponding to the fiscal revenue recentralized in 
the “tax sharing system” reform in 1994. 
The decreasing budgetary tax revenue, along with the increasing expenditures 
at the local level due to the rapid urbanization, has shifted local government’s 
focus from public goods supply to public goods financing. Given the 
inadequate revenue resources from the formal fiscal system, local 
governments seek extra-budgetary channels to finance the growing 
expenditures. Land transfer fee
13
 has become an important extra-budgetary 
revenue source as a result of the land value marketization since 1987. The 
increasing reliance on “land transfer fee” has caused dramatic farmland 
requisitions and in effect sparked political resistance from farmers. 
The current policy debate is whether to implement residential property tax. 
Chinese scholars focus on several issues. First, whether implementing 
residential property tax can improve the current tax system. It argues that 
residential property tax can provide local government a valid tax instrument 
                                                             
13 Land transfer fee is paid in an upfront lump sum to local governments for 
obtaining land use rights to develop commercial housing.  





for the welfare distribution to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. 
Second, whether the residential property tax reform can provide a stable fiscal 
revenue flow, in order to confront the problem of decreasing available land 
areas for sale. Third, many studies focus on the impacts of residential property 
tax on the housing market. Some studies argue that the residential property tax 
would increase housing price, while the others hold the opposite views. 
However, no consensus has been achieved on this issue. In addition, most 
studies were descriptive analyses and the theoretical studies were just started 
last year. Moreover, few studies examine the impact of the residential property 
tax reform on the transformation of Chinese economic growth pattern. Our 
model enables us to address these concerns
14
 in an all-round way, which 
provides not only a quantitative analysis on how the property tax would affect 
the whole economy, but also the political economic implications on the degree 
of support for the residential property tax reform. We will address the 
following issues in this chapter: 
(i) The impacts of residential property tax on the housing market 
(ii) Can residential property tax help promote a sustainable growth pattern 
based on consumption growth? 
(iii) The role of the primary objective of GDP in the government’s public 
expenditure choice 
(iv) The political implications for implementing residential property tax 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model calibration. It 
firstly justifies the assumptions of the theoretical model that are applicable in 
China. Secondly, it parameterizes the production technology and household 
preference. Then, it obtains the residential property tax rate using the equal 
revenue approach. It furthers to calibrate the initial public goods with the VAT 
regime. Finally, it verifies the validity of the parameter value and the tax rate 
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 Except that the welfare distribution. 





chosen under the current VAT-dominated tax system. Section 3 provides 
simulation results on the public goods choice under VAT vs. VAT-and-APT 
(VAT&APT) regime and with the alternative weights on the GDP objective. It 
also provides an attempt to investigate the impacts of location specific 
attributes on the political support of APT reform and the local GDP. Section 4 
addresses the issues presented in the outset to provide policy implications in 
China’s current system. 
5.2 Model Calibration 
We consider a local government’s incumbency of a median-term (e.g. 5 years). 
Given the initial capital stocks and urban amenity levels, the incumbent local 
government makes the expenditure choice that will maximize his utility, 
consisting of GDP and the quality of life , and subject 
to the balanced budget constraint. 
5.2.1 Justifications of the Assumptions  
The theoretical model stated in Chapter 3 assumes that (i) there are many 
small open cities, (ii) both firms and developers are perfect competitors, and 
(iii) workers are freely mobile. 
(1) “Many Small Open Cities” 
China started the “open market” reform in 1978. Since then, China’s economy 
has gradually transformed from planned economy to market-oriented 
economy.  
In 1980s, the first special economic zones are granted to Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan, which are provided privileges in economic 
policy for doing business, especially export-oriented business. In 1984, 14 
more coastal cities are open to foreign investments. Since 1988, the mainland 
   , , gU GDP     





China has opened a number of border cities and all the capital cities of both 
inland provinces and autonomous regions
15
.  
From 1978 to 2009, the number of Chinese cities has increased from 233 to 
657, which increasingly enhances the intergovernmental competition for fiscal 
and political purpose (Li, 2011). 
Therefore, due to the openness of China’s economy and the vast number of 
cities in China, it is sufficient to make the assumption that they are “many 
small open cities”. 
(2) “Perfectly Competitive Firms and Developers” 
Although it is still on its way toward market economy, the openness of 
Chinese cities to foreign investments has led to increasingly capital mobility. 
Foreign capital investments in China have increased from average US$2.3 
billion in 1984-1989 to US$40.6 in 1995-1999 and US$191.26 billion in 
2008-2012. In 2005, the total number of private enterprises is 1.98 million, 
which increases 49 percent relative to 2001, whereas, the state-owned and 
collectively owned enterprises decrease 48 and 46 percent compared with 
2001, respectively
16
. Therefore, the traded goods firms are competitive. 
The share of housing constructions by private developers has had an 
increasing rate in the total housing supply, since the housing marketization 
reform in 1998
17
. Therefore, the housing developers are competitive in China’s 
housing market (Fu et al, 2010). 
                                                             
15
 See “Special Economic Zones of the People’s Republic of China” from Wikipedia, 
the free encyclopedia. 
16 Bulletin of National Economic Census 2005. 
17
 The new urban homes traded in the housing market shared over 60 percent. The 
private residential developers were arising to over 60 thousand in 2008. The largest 
housing developers have a small market share of about 4.2 percent in 2004. See Fu et 
al (2010). 





(3) “Freely Mobile Workers” 
Labor mobility is constrained by the Household Registration System, which is 
a unique feature of China’s governance system. In 1958, the first restrictive 
regulation on rural-urban migration was issued with the purpose of limiting 
overflow of rural labor into urban locations. In 1978, the restriction was 
relaxed to allow high skilled workers and their families to obtain a citizenship. 
Along with the increasing “open market” reform, the household registration 
system was gradually reformed and an increase in rural-urban migration 
occurred.  
The urbanization rate increased from 13 percent in 1958 to 18 percent in 1978. 
From 1978 onwards, the urbanization process experienced rapid growth rates 
to 33 percent in 1998 and then 50 percent by 2009. This rapid urbanization 
was driven by the economic growth accompanying with the housing and labor 
market reform (Fu et al.2008). The massive labor relocation is documented in 
the 2000 population census that labor mobility to the city accounts for 77.9 
percent of the total mobility in China and 40.7 percent was attributed to 
inter-city labor mobility. Rural-city mobility makes up for the remaining 
percentage. It should be noted that inter-city labor mobility is experiencing a 
more rapid increase than the rule-urban mobility. The current policy reform 
also endeavors to further relax the labor mobility. Therefore, the free labor 
mobility assumption can be warranted from this point of view. 
Overall, considering the context of China stated above, we cannot reject that 
the theoretical model can be applied to China to understand the issues of 
residential property tax reform. 
5.2.2 Parameterizing the Model 
(1) Production Technology and Household Preference 
For this numerical analysis, data was sourced from China Financial Yearbook 





1978-2010 and Statistical Yearbook of The Chinese Investment in Fixed 
Assets. 
This analysis calibrates the parameters into China's case that the wage share in 
GDP is around 50 percent, hence the capital share in traded and non-traded 
goods sector is chosen at  and , respectively; accordingly, the 
wage share in both sectors are  and , respectively. Since 
housing supply elasticity ( ) is close to 1.5 in China (Fu et al, 2010), the 
public capital share in total capital employed is . Since the public 
capital investment accounted for an average of 70 percent of total capital 
investment from 1980 to 2000 (Statistical Yearbook of The Chinese 
Investment in Fixed Assets), the public capital share in total capital employed 
is . The housing expenditure in China is about 50 percent of total 
income . The agglomeration economies are selected at . 
Table 5.1 Parameter values 
Variable Selected Value Empirical Value 
 0.5 Wage share of GDP is around 50 percent 
 0.7 
Public capital share in total capital investments 
at around 70 percent. 
 0.5 Wage share of GDP is around 50 percent 
 0.8 Housing supply elasticity ( ) at 0.62-1.46 
 0.5 
Housing expenditure shares around 50 percent 
of total income in China 
 0.03 0.01-0.4 
Wage share of GDP is from Vincelette et al(2010); housing supply elasticity at 
0.62-1.46 is from Fu et al(2010); other parameter values are empirical value. 
(2) Initial Tax Rates under Equivalent Tax Revenue 
The tax rate of VAT in China ranges from 3 percent to 17 percent, with the 
0.5  0.5 




















majority of goods and services subject to 13 percent to 17 percent tax rates. 
This study chooses the 13 percent VAT rate as the initial tax rate for the 
analysis 
0 0.13v  . Then, we consider tax regime change by reducing VAT 
from 0.13 to 0.10 and initiating APT to compensate the loss of the VAT 
revenue. 
Since the traded and non-traded goods output ratio is independent of the public 
goods, APT rate can be calibrated with the specified production technology 
and household preference under the condition of equivalent initial tax revenue, 
regardless of initial public goods. Using a simple search algorithms method, 
the APT tax rate is solved at 0.1171P  . We denote the new tax regime as 
VAT&APT. 
Therefore, our focus is on the impacts of the tax regime change from the old 
tax regime VAT 
0 00.13, 0v P    to the new tax regime VAT&APT 
0.10, 0.1171v P   . These impacts include the public expenditure choice, 
the city housing rental price, wage rate, city size and non-traded incremental 
land rent and GDP. 
(3) Initial Public Goods Calibration 
Despite the existence of an item called “capital construction” in the budget 
account in the China Financial Yearbook, many capital constructions done by 
different departments are not included in the “capital construction”. Therefore, 
the public capital stock is not well documented in China’s database. We use 
our model with the identified production technology, household preference 
and taxes to solve for initial public goods. The initial public goods are 
calibrated under the VAT regime, as the present China’s tax system is without 
APT. 
The public capital stock calibration is based on its contribution to GDP. 
According to Eq.(4.24), GDP is calculated with 









      . Public capital T in the traded 
sector is Z QT T  , inserting into the above GDP formula to obtain the 
contribution of the public capital T stock to GDP 
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     . Therefore, the public capital T 



















  ( 5.1 ) 
The average GDP is 722.33 (10billion yuan), which is obtained from the 
China Financial Yearbook that covers the period 1978-2008
18
. Since the 
public capital stock comprises about 27 percent of GDP, from Eq.(5.1) the 
public capital T stock is 195.9810 (10billion yuan) . 
The public service includes the cultural, education and health. The expenditure 
on public service shared local GNP 2.76 percent in 1978, 2.85 percent in 1988, 
2.3 percent in 1995, 2.48 percent in 1998, and 2.67 percent in 1999 (Wong, 
2002)
19
. The public service, natural amenities and initial public capital H are 
solved based on three conditions (i) the GDP equals 722.33; (ii) the public 
service expenditure is averaged 2.61 percent of GDP; (iii) the fiscal revenue is 
around 10 percent of GDP
20
. Therefore, the initial public goods are solved for 
at 0 217.2358HZ  , 0 1.132   and 8.0664  . 
                                                             
18
 Since the China Financial Yearbook does not contain the city level data, we use the 
aggregate GDP instead. Moreover, this study is limited with the GDP value without 
excluding agricultural, fishery and forest industry. 
19
 We acknowledge the inaccuracy of using GNP instead of GDP, but the share won’t 
be affected too much, because the GNP to GDP ratio ranges between 98.3 percent and 
100.44 percent from 1990 to 2010. 
20
 Calculated from China Financial Yearbook 1978-2010. 
0 195.9810TZ 





(4) Examining Validity 
We compare the calibrated results with the statistical data or the existing 
studies on the explained variables to examine the validity of the parameter 
choice and tax rates of VAT specified above. This examination will not include 
residential property tax because it is unavailable in the statistical data under 
the present system of China. Table 5.2 presents the result. 
Table 5.2 Testing parameter and tax rate of VAT choice 
Variable Calibrated Value Statistical Value 
 0.7752 Around 70% 
 0.1008 10%-31% 
The statistical value of traded goods share in GDP is obtained from WB(2010) by 
removing agriculture sector; the tax revenue to GDP is the average value from China 
Financial Yearbook 1978-2008. 
The result shows that the traded goods output takes up around 77.5 percent of 
GDP. It also shows that the tax revenue share of GDP is at 10.1 percent. In 
comparison, statistical data shows that traded goods contribute to GDP
 
at 
around 70 percent in recent years and the tax revenue to GDP ranges between 
10 percent and 31 percent. Our calibration results fall within the feasible range, 
which verified the chosen value of the parameter and VAT rate at 0.13. 
5.3 Simulation Results 
This simulation focuses on the government’s public goods choice between 
public capital T and the public service, given public capital H. Similar analysis 
can be applied to the public goods choice between public capital H and public 
service, which is not included in this study. 
0 0TQ GDP
0 0RV GDP





5.3.1 The Simulation Results of Public Goods 
Choice 
(1) The Diagrammatical Simulation Results 
After setting the initial public goods and the tax rates, we can simulate 
diagrammatically, corresponding to Chapter 4, the PPF of the budget 
constraint for the VAT and VAT&APT, and the effects of different preference 
for GDP, as shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 Local government’s public goods choice incentives  
Note: 
The “Budget Curve under VAT” shows the production possibility frontier (PPF) for 
public capital T ( I
T
) and public service ( ) provision under the VAT regime, while 
the “Budget Curve under VAT&APT” shows the PPF under VAT&APT regime. The 
PPF of budget constraint is steeper with VAT than VAT&APT. The government utility 
curve is plotted with the weights of 0.5 and 0.7 on GDP, separately. The higher the 
weight is, the steeper the slope. 





Figure 5.1 exposes the public goods choices between public capital T and 
public service. They show that under the VAT regime, the PPF is steeper than 
VAT&APT, which implies that the incentive to provide public service is lower 
under VAT than VAT&APT. It also shows that the higher weight on GDP is, 
the lower the incentive to provide public services. 
In addition, we can solve for the initial housing rental price, local wage rate, 
and city size, the traded and non-traded goods outputs and their ratio. Table 
5.3 presents these initial city statuses. 






 1.8274103 1.7438103 
 0.6681 0.6522 
 0.1777 0.1856 
 162.3843 144.8524 
 559.9457 558.2531 
 ,v P    0.29 0.2595 
, , , , , , , , 0.0012   
The second column of Table 5.3 presents the initial city profiles of the VAT 
regime, while the third column illustrates the case of the new tax regime of 
VAT&APT. 
As shown in Table 5.3, the initial city size and housing rental price under VAT 
are bigger than under VAT&APT, while the local wage rate is relatively lower 
under VAT regime than that under VAT&APT regime. According to Claim #4, 
it indicates that the opportunity cost of supplying public service is higher 
under VAT than VAT&APT due to the larger city size associated with the 
VAT regime. This also accounts for the simulation result of the PPF with VAT 
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is steeper than with VAT&APT in Figure 5.1. 
In addition, as shown in Table 5.3, given the public goods, shifting from VAT 
regime to VAT&APT regime, both non-traded and traded goods outputs 
decrease; this finding is consistent with Claim #2. Moreover, the reduction of 
the non-traded goods output is much larger than that of traded goods output, 
which indicates that by changing the tax regime from VAT to VAT&APT 
regime under equivalent initial revenue, there is a substantially greater impact 
on the non-traded goods than traded goods, as the non-traded sector is less 
mobile and in effect would bare more burdens of the taxation, which is 
indicated by the ratio of non-traded to traded output ratio  ,v P    decreasing 
from 0.29 under VAT to 0.2595 under VAT&APT. 
(2) Residential Property Tax vs. Value-Added Tax 
As suggested by Eq.(4.21), the different tax regimes affect the public goods 
choice through substitution effects as well as via the income effects. Therefore, 
the resulting public goods levels reflect not only the substitution effects, but 
also the income effects. The income effects may confound the substitution 
effects when we compare the level of the public goods with changing the tax 
regimes. As local government incentive for public goods choice between 
public capitals versus public service is mainly determined by the substitution 
effect, we use the expenditure share in the tax revenue to measure this 
substitution effect and disentangle the income effect. 
Row 2 of Table 5.4 shows the public goods choice under the two alternative 
tax regimes. The share of the expenditure of the two public goods is presented 
in the third and fourth rows to indicate government’s expenditure incentive. 
From the fifth to seventh rows, the results are stated on the impacts of 
government’s expenditures on the housing rental price, wage rate and city size, 
respectively. 
 





Table 5.4 Numerical results of public goods choice under different tax regimes 
Variable VAT VAT&APT 
( ) (80.5172, 0.9844) (80.6346, 1.0047) 
 0.8733 0.8713 
 0.1267 0.1287 
P 0.766 0.7482 
W 0.1934 0.2016 
N 2126.9 2041.2 
, , , , , , , 0.0012   
It shows that under the old tax regime with single VAT, the expenditure on 
both public goods is less than that under the new tax regime of VAT&APT, 
which indicates that implementing APT expands the fiscal revenue. It also 
shows that the public service expenditure share increases by shifting to the 
new tax regime. Moreover, the implementation of APT will result in a higher 
local wage rate, but a lower housing rental price and a smaller city size. These 
findings imply that imposing residential property tax can mitigate the house 
price and increase the government’s incentive to provide public services. It 
contributes to the current debates on whether the residential property tax can 
help curb the high housing price and reduce local government’s incentive for 
public capital investment in China. 
(3) Objective of GDP vs. Quality of Life 
Local government’s preference for GDP and the quality of life is indicated by 
the weight  . This simulation chooses two alternative weights 0.5   and 
0.7   to investigate the effects of government’s more preferences for GDP in 
China. 
Table 5.5 presents the result of the impacts of the different weights assigned to 
GDP and urban quality of life on the local public goods choice. The second 
,TI 
TI RV
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column states the result of equally weighted GDP and urban quality of life, 
while the third column depicts more weights assigned to GDP than the quality 
of life. 
Table 5.5 Numerical result of public goods choice with different preference 
Tax regime 
0.5   
( ) 
0.7   
( ) 
VAT (76.9711 , 1.0241 ) (80.5172, 0.9844) 
VAT&APT (77.0339 , 1.0451) (80.6346, 1.0047) 
The impacts of different preference on the public goods choice need not use the 
public expenditure’s share to indicate the spending incentive, because they go to the 
opposite direction. Other parameters values are 0.5  , 0.7  , 0.5  , 0.8  , 
, 0.5  , 6b  , 0.0012  . 
Under the equal weights between GDP and quality of life, the government’s 
choices of the public capital T and the public service are 76.9711 and 1.0241 
under the VAT regime, and 77.0339 and 1.0451 under the VAT&APT regime, 
respectively. In the case of more weights on GDP than the quality of life, the 
public capital T and public service choice are 80.5172 and 0.9844 under the 
VAT regime, and 80.6346 and 1.0047 under the VAT&APT regime, 
respectively. These results show that the more weights local government 
assigns to GDP, there will be a greater expenditure on public capitals and less 
on public service, which imply that the more weights on GDP is, the more 
incentive to public capital investments 
Hence, given that local governments in China have been documented with 
giving first priority to local economic development (e.g. Zhuravskaya, 2000), 
this finding attributes the inter-governmental competition for public capital 
investments to the incentive of GDP objective. 
5.3.2 The Public Goods Choice for Different Types of 
Cities 
The different types of cities are measured in terms of the production 
,TI  ,TI 
0.03 





technology ( , ,  and ) and household preference ( ). The following 
numerical results are based on the change of the parameters at uniformly 
increasing 0.1 relative to the based case , , , , 
. Changing the production technology and household preference will 
cause the residential property tax rate to vary according to the equivalent 
initial tax revenue, as shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 Numerical results of residential property tax rate in different cities 
Parameters  
     
APT( P )  0.1171 0.1571 0.1213 0.1142 0.1193 0.1641 
APTs are calibrated using the same approach aforementioned in Section 5.2.2: 
shifting the tax regime from VAT 0.13
0v
   to VAT&APT by reducing VAT to 
0.10
v
   and initiating with APT; then, this APT is solved with the equivalent 
initial tax revenue condition. Other parameters are fixed: the publicness 0.0012  ; 
the agglomeration economies  ; the weight on GDP is 0.7  . 
Based on the above APTs, the public goods choice in different cities is then 
calculated in Table 5.7. 







(80.5172, 0.9844) (80.6346, 1.0047) 
 (42.5496, 1.1239) (42.5297, 1.145) 
 (68.1932, 1.0868) (68.2202, 1.0982) 
 (87.6131, 0.9394) (87.72, 0.9567) 
 (85.3737, 0.9543) (85.5053, 0.9762) 
 (88.5117, 0.956) (88.7028, 0.9778) 
, 0.0012  , , 0.7   
The second column in Table 5.7 shows the public goods choice under the VAT 
    
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regime for different types of cities. The results for the VAT&APT regime are 
presented in the third column. For a city with a higher capital intensity 
production technology 0.6  , its public capital expenditure is higher under 
VAT&APT regime than under VAT regime, while contrarily the public 
service is lower, which indicates that the incentive for public service 
expenditure is higher by initiating APT. The reasoning is that the lower labor 
factor share (higher capital intensity) in the production induces a smaller city 
size, which has a lower cost for public service provision; therefore, the 
opportunity cost for supplying public service will be lower. 
For other types of cities, both the public capital and public services levels are 
higher with the VAT&APT regime than with the VAT regime. It indicates that 
the fiscal capacity is expanded for these cities
21
. Therefore, to identify the 
incentive of government for expenditure choice in the different cities, the 
share of public goods expenditure is used, as shown in Table 5.8. 




( , ) 
VAT&APT 
( , ) 
 
(0.8733, 0.1267) (0.8713, 0.1287) 
 (0.8344, 0.1656) (0.8319, 0.1681) 
 (0.852, 0.148) (0.8508, 0.1492) 
 (0.8838, 0.1162) (0.8821, 0.1179) 
 (0.8926, 0.1074) (0.8906, 0.1094) 
 (0.8902, 0.1098) (0.8883, 0.1117) 
, 0.0012  , , 0.7   
Table 5.8 shows that in every type of city, shifting from VAT regime to 
                                                             
21
 We also found that the fiscal revenue with the higher capital intensity city ( ) 
is 50.9934 with VAT and 51.1225 with VAT&APT, which also demonstrates the 
expansion of the fiscal revenue with initiating APT, as is consistent with the other 
types of cities. 
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VAT&APT regime increases the expenditure share of public service, which 
implies that APT enhances local government’s incentive for public service 
provision regardless of the types. 
In the base case, the public capital expenditure share is 87.33 percent and the 
public service is 12.67 percent of total budget outlay under the VAT regime. 
For a higher capital intensity in the traded sector 0.6  , the public capital 
expenditure share is 83.44 percent and the public service expenditure is 16.56 
percent. In the non-traded sector, a higher capital intensity 0.6   results in 
85.20 percent of public expenditure on public capital and 14.80 percent on the 
public service. It implies that the expenditure on public service increases with 
a higher capital intensity, while the public capital investment decreases for 
both tax regimes. The reason is that the higher capital intensity induces a 
smaller city size, which mitigates the opportunity cost of public service 
provision. Therefore, the local government in a city with a higher capital 
intensive production will have more incentive to increase public service 
expenditure. 
By contrast, the higher public capital share in both traded and non-traded 
goods production 0.8   and 0.9   will induce the local government to 
spend less on public service provision, because these two factors increase the 
productivity of the pubic capital, which is taken as given for production when 
they choose private inputs. Consequently, the production output is larger, 
which can accommodate relatively more people. Therefore, a larger city size 
will induce lower incentive for public service provision. 
Similarly, the higher preference for traded goods ( 0.6  ) induces a larger city 
size as each individual consumption less non-traded goods, hence more people 
can be accommodate. A larger city size leads to a lower expenditure in public 
service. 





5.3.3 Non-traded Incremental Land Rents in 
Different Types of Cities 
We use the non-traded incremental land rent to measure the response of 
different types of cities to the APT reform, because the vested interest that 
influences the reform receives the non-traded incremental land rents. The 
non-traded incremental land rent refers to the incremental land rent in the 
non-traded sector resulting from local government’s public capital investment 
and public service provision. 
Table 5.9 Numerical results of local non-traded incremental land rents in 
different cities 
Parameters VAT VAT&APT % change 
 
17.3185 15.7242 -9.2058 
 5.4602 4.7061 -13.8108 
 15.307 13.9206 -9.0573 
 21.1395 19.2963 -8.71922 
 19.2712 17.3661 -9.8857 
 16.0562 13.9614 -13.0467 
The non-traded incremental land rent measures the land rent increase in the 
non-traded sector as a result of governments public goods choice in comparison to the 




   . Other parameters values are , 
0.0012  , , 0.7  . 
Table 5.9 shows the results of the non-traded incremental land rent for 
different types of cities after government’s expenditure choice. The second and 
third columns represent the two alternative tax regimes, respectively. The last 
column describes percentage changes of the incremental land rent by shifting 
from VAT to VAT&APT regime, which measures the magnitude of the city’s 



















It shows that by implementing APT, the non-traded incremental land rent is 
reduced relative to that under the VAT regime. In the base case, the reduction 
of non-traded incremental land rent is 9.2058 percent. The reduction is highest 
at -13.8108 percent in a city with a higher capital intensity in traded goods 
production ( ); a higher preference for traded goods consumption (  ) comes 
as the second largest impact at -13.0467 percent; the public capital share in 
traded goods production (  ) also strengthens the reduction of the non-traded 
incremental land rent.  
The reasoning is that the higher share of capital factor in the traded goods 
production is associated with fewer labor inputs; hence, it results in a smaller 
city size, which lowers the demand of non-traded goods, consequently, the 
non-traded incremental land rent decreases. The non-traded incremental land 
rent is sensitive to capital intensity, because its negative effect on the city size 
acts directly through labor factor demand. A direct impact of the higher 
preference for traded goods consumption is the reduction of the non-traded 
goods consumption; hence it acerbates the reduction of the non-traded 
incremental land rent. The mechanism of the public capital share in the traded 
good production is distinct from the capital intensity and preference for traded 
goods aforementioned. The increase in traded sector’s public capital input 
share will benefit the labor productivity, which increases local wage rate, city 
size, housing rental price, and consequently the non-traded goods consumption. 
However, this incremental land rent is more with VAT regime than with the 
VAT&APT regime. Therefore, the shifting of the tax regime from VAT to 
VAT&APT enlarges the gap with a higher traded goods’ public capital share.  
Both the total capital and public capital share in non-traded goods production 
(   and  ) mitigate the reduction of non-traded incremental land rent from 
the tax regime change, because those factors increase the non-traded land 
rent’s share in the non-traded goods output, which can cushion the negative 
impacts from the tax regime change. 
These results imply that the APT reform will encounter political resistance 





owing to a reduction of the non-traded incremental land rent. In addition, cities 
with more capital intensity for traded goods production, higher preference for 
traded goods consumption, and higher public capital share in traded goods 
production would less likely support the APT reform. Cities with higher 
capital intensive and public capital share in the non-traded goods production 
will less likely resist the APT reform. 
5.3.4 GDP in Different Types of Cities 
The effect of the tax regime reform on the local GDP in different types of 
cities is shown in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 Numerical results of GDP in different cities 
Parameters VAT VAT&APT % change 
 
914.9233 915.4889 0.0618 
 483.2603 479.1904 -0.1189 
 783.0501 787.9543 0.6263 
 983.7428 988.8981 0.5240 
 949.1523 946.0819 -0.0032 
 931.1528 930.5226 -0.0677 
GDP is calculated according to Eq.(3.23). Other parameters values are , 
0.0012  , , 0.7  . 
Table 5.10 presents the results of the tax reform impacts on GDP for different 
types of city. The second and third column represents the VAT and VAT&APT 
regime separately. The last column shows the percentage change of GDP by 
changing the tax regime from VAT to VAT&APT regime. It shows that shifting 
the tax regime to VAT&APT can either increase or decrease the GDP, 
depending on the type of the city. For higher capital intensity and public 
capital factor share in the traded goods sector ( 0.6   and 0.8  ) and the 



















regime will be lower than that with VAT regime. Increasing non-traded 
sector’s total capital share ( 0.6  ) and the public capital share ( 0.9  ) will 
promote GDP by the implementation of APT. 
5.4 Policy Implications 
(1) The Impacts of Residential Property Tax on 
Housing Market 
China’s housing market has attracted huge investments. The continued high 
housing price could be attributed to the rapid urbanization and the lack of 
alternative investment goods in the financial market that are safer than housing. 
The urbanization rate is 53.73 percent in 2013. Chinese government aims to 
reach 75 percent to catch up with the developed countries in 2040. It implies 
that the housing price would be continuously high. 
Our findings show that the residential property tax in comparison to the 
value-added tax results in a lower housing rental price, because the residential 
property tax is a consumer tax that increases the total-of-tax housing price, 
which disincentives the housing consumption. Therefore, residential property 
tax can curb both the individual’s over consumption of housing and the 
investment-purposed housing consumption. 
Therefore, residential property tax can rationalize the housing market. 
(2) Can Residential Property Tax Help Promote a 
Sustainable Growth Pattern Based on Consumption 
Growth? 
Local government’s active role in public investment has become the driving 
force for the capital intensive growth pattern of China’s economy over past 
decades. Figure C.3.3.1 shows that local expenditure on economic 





development and urban utility consists of 35 percent of local total expenditure, 
relative to 25 percent on public service. 
Our findings show that the current VAT-dominated tax system contributes to 
the public goods choice in preferring public capitals to public service, due to 
the higher opportunity cost of public service provision associated with the 
VAT regime. By implementing residential property tax, local government’s 
public expenditure choice will turn over to increasing public service provision; 
it also increases local fiscal revenue, which expands the fiscal capacity, hence 
it can reduce reliance on “land financing”. 
In addition, local wage rate will increase with residential property tax in 
comparison to the value-added tax regime. This implies that the consumption 
share in GDP can also be increased. 
Therefore, residential property tax can help promote a sustainable growth 
pattern by shifting a capital intensive growth mode to a consumption-based 
growth mode. 
(3) What Is the Role of The Primary Objective of GDP 
in The Government’s Public Expenditure Choice? 
China’s administrative system is a vertical 5-layer system, the 
center-province-city-county-townships, with each lower layer encompassing 
within the higher layer geographically and politically. 
The Communist Party of China is the only ruling party in China, which 
determines the policy making decisions. The economic development policy 
has been setup as a nationwide overriding goal ever since the Communist 
Party assumed power in China. Policy implementation is monitored by the 
Communist Party at each level of government. 
The local government officials are not elected by residents, but instead they 
are promoted by upper level officials based on the GDP growth. The upper 





level officials belong to the Communist Party. Thus, the CP has the final say in 
an officials’ promotion. The five-layer administrative system creates a vertical 
layer-by-layer responsibility system. The one party ruling system further 
solidifies the vertical relationship. Moreover, the personnel system strengthens 
the upward accountability. The government relationship at the horizontal level 
is relatively weak, which creates inter-governmental competition for GDP. 
We find that local government pursuing GDP rather than the quality of life 
induces distortions on public expenditures that more is spent on public capital 
investments than public service provisions. Therefore, this primary objective 
of GDP also accounts for the capital-intensive growth pattern of China. 
In sum, the GDP-oriented promotion system creates a barrier for APT reform 
because local governments lack the accountability to its residents. Therefore, 
increasing local government’s accountability to local residents is critical for 
APT reform. There are two feasible proposals to increase the local 
government’s accountability. One is to adjust the local government’s career 
measurements by reducing the weights put on GDP; the other is increasing the 
transparency of the local budgeting process by publicizing the allocation of 
land transfer revenues and increasing public participations in the 
determination of local policies. To increase the accountability of local 
government to its residents, further reform on Household Registration System 
to emancipate the power of the “voting with feet” mechanism will increase 
local government’s competition for people, which helps to constraint local 
government’s behavior. 
(4) The Political Implications for Residential Property 
Tax Reform 
Urban land is owned by the state, but it is operated by the municipal 
governments. Since the urban land use has been reformed to market-oriented 
in 1987, land sales create a huge premium, which is the incremental land rent 
from non-traded sector. 





Rural land is owned by the collectives for farmland use or for farmer’s 
residential use. The residential land use, as stipulated, cannot be transacted in 
the open market. The privilege of local government to expropriate collective 
lands has provided them the monopoly power in the primary land market, 
which incentivizes them to rely on “land financing”. Moreover, the lower 
compensation also creates a huge premium from converting the farmland to 
the industrial or commercial land. This further incentivizes local government’s 
reliance on “land financing”. 
Our results show that the non-traded incremental land rent will decrease as a 
result of implementing residential property tax. This implies that local 
government who relies on “land financing” will resist the residential property 
tax reform. 
Therefore, the residential property tax reform needs to be accompanied with 
the land management system reform, because allowing the rural residential 
land to be transacted in the open market can weaken the monopoly power of 
local government in the land market; in addition, increasing compensation for 
farmland acquisition can also rationalize government’s incentive for “land 
financing”. 
5.5 Summary 
This study has numerically examined the impacts of shifting the currently 
VAT-dominated tax system to incorporating APT in China. The findings have 
shown that by decreasing VAT level from 13 percent to 10 percent, there needs 
to be an increase of 11.17 percent in APT to compensate the loss of VAT 
revenue in the benchmark case. This shifting of the tax system will decrease 
the housing rental price, reduce city size and increase local wage rate. It has 
also found that while the incentive of the public service provision will be 
improved by initiating APT, the incremental non-traded land rent will be 
depressed. Therefore, implementing residential property tax is able to promote 
a sustainable economic growth pattern. However, it also implies that the local 





governments will resist APT reform. We have also found that the local 
government putting more weights on GDP than on the quality of life accounts 
for the capital-intensive growth pattern of China’s economy. 
The examination of the responses to APT reform for different types of city has 
shown that they all resist APT reform but their degree of resistance varies 
according to the type of city. It has also found that GDP can be increased or 
decreased with the APT reform depending on the types of city. These findings 
imply that residential property tax reform needs take into account the different 
types of city. 
The policy implication analysis has suggested that imposing residential 
property tax requires other complementary reforms, including the land 
management system, the local government’s performance measurement and 
the Household Registration System. 
In addition, the implementation of the APT reform also requires addressing 
technique issues, for example, housing market value assessment, property tax 
rate design for different cities, property ownership identification, and so on. 
However, these technique issues, as agreed by Chinese scholars, can be 
resolved. 
In sum, addressing how the incremental land rent is allocated as well as local 





Chapter 6  Conclusions and Extensions 
Fiscal decentralization increases inter-governmental competition for mobile 
resources. The influence of competition for mobile resources on 
policy-making is a major subject of the tax competition literature (Matsumoto, 
2004). This study examined the effect of value-added tax and residential 
property tax regimes on the incentive of local public goods choice. 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
Our findings have highlighted that the local tax structure in China dominated 
with VAT and without APT contributes to the public good choice of favoring 
public capital investments to public service provision. It has also demonstrated 
that the currently high housing rental price and low wage rate are attributed to 
this VAT-dominated local tax system. The critical endogenous variable that 
accounts for the local government’s expenditure bias is the relatively larger 
city size with the VAT regime than that with the APT regime. This is because 
VAT, which acts as an external shock, depresses the city size less than that 
APT does as an internal shock. VAT affects the city performance in a way 
similar as productivity shock, while APT directly impacts labor supply by 
increasing the living cost of labors in terms of a higher total-of-tax housing 
price. Therefore, VAT causes fewer labors to flee away from the city than APT. 
The finding of the decrease in the incremental non-traded land rents has also 
implied the potential political resistance for APT regime from the city 
governments. 
It has also examined different types of city by varying the capital intensity in 
both traded and non-traded goods production, public capital share in total 
capital in both traded and non-traded goods production, and household 
consumption preference. The responses of different types of city to the 




residential property tax reform vary in degree, but they all resist to the reform 
in terms of reducing the non-traded incremental land rent. It has also shown 
that city GDP can either increase or decrease in different cities. 
In addition, the investigation of the local government’s preference for GDP 
has shown that the local government’s GDP prior objective contributes to the 
capital investment rather than public service provision. 
These findings has suggested that China’s economic growth pattern of capital 
intensity is driven at least to some extent by the local tax structure without 
residential property tax as well as the GDP objective. 
The study has also provided some political implications for APT reform. Since 
the APT reform will reduce the non-traded incremental land rent, the local 
governments who rely on “land financing” will resist to APT reform. For APT 
reform to succeed, improvement of the land management system and the local 
government’s accountability to local residents are needed.
6.2 Contributions 
The findings of this study have shown that city performance depends on local 
fiscal conditions of both taxes and public goods. However, the equilibrium tax 
bases of VAT and APT are independent of the public good mix. Existing 
studies argue that a public good has different impacts on the tax bases, which 
will induce different incentives for public goods choices (e.g. Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1978; Glaeser, 1996; Keen and Marchand, 1997). Our finding is in 
sharp contrast to this literature. This departure may lie in the model setup for 
two potential reasons: first, while their models are either the partial 
equilibrium model (e.g. city size fixed, income fixed) or do not account for the 
housing sector, our model is a general equilibrium model including the 
housing sector. The partial equilibrium model failed in capturing the local 
price variation. The housing sector is important at the local level because the 
property tax on housing is an important source of local fiscal revenue for 
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many countries. Given the advantages of a general equilibrium model in 
accounting for local price variance, it is possible that our findings would have 
more explanatory power. 
Second, our findings highlight the importance of endogenous budget balance 
analysis. We found that the opportunity cost under the VAT regime is higher 
than that under VAT&APT regime, and the induced congestion cost plays a 
critical role in driving this difference. Hence, VAT regime provides less 
incentive for local government to provide public services than public capitals. 
Therefore, although the relative tax base of VAT to property tax is 
independent of the public good mix, the incentive of the two tax regimes is 
distinctive by taking into account the expenditure side, which is consistent 
with the vast literature that property tax provides more incentive for public 
service provision. 
Third, these findings provide an insightful view on China’s economic growth 
pattern. Although many studies have attempted to understand the incentives of 
intergovernmental competition for accounting for China’s economic 
development (Cai and Treisman, 2004; Bai et al., 2007; Weingast, 2006; Zhou 
Li-an, 2010), these studies failed to well explain the city performance such as 
high housing prices, high saving rates, large city size in big cities in the course 
of China’s economic growth, because their analyses are not conduced in the 
context of tax competition. Our study understood local government incentives 
for choosing among multiple local public goods under different financing 
regimes to account for the capital-intensive economic growth pattern of China 
in a cross-city spatial equilibrium framework. This study provided additional 
evidence among the few studies from an urban accounting context to 
understanding China’s growth. 
Finally, the adoption of the numerical analysis on the tax regime reform in this 
study is a significant contribution, given that no data is currently available for 
the residential property tax. In addition, the specific form of the model also 
enabled us to examine the political economics on the city’s response to the 
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residential property tax reform, which fill the gap in literature that few were 
observed. 
6.3 Extensions 
(1) Endogenous Housing Supply Elasticity and Land 
Use Regulation 
This study mainly focused on the public service and the public capital in the 
traded goods sector, while the public capital input for the non-traded goods 
production has not been much analyzed. As a direct extension of this study, 
analogous analysis can be applied to the public goods choice between public 
capital in the non-traded sector and the public service. 
Housing supply elasticity depends on the supply of local non-traded capital, 
which is de facto the land input in the housing service production. Therefore, 
the housing supply elasticity is endogenized with the public goods choice. The 
land supply is regulated by local government’s preference, local natural 
amenities, local productivity and governance efficiency. Therefore, a further 
extension can be conducted is on the relationship between the endogenous 
housing supply elasticity and the land use regulation. The impacts of land use 
regulations on housing rental price, local wage rate and city size can also be 
examined with our model. Literature on this issue is usually found to assume 
exogenous land use regulation and therefore the housing supply elasticity is 
treated as invariant (see Fu et al. 2010 for a review). This study endogenizes 
the housing supply elasticity, which fills the gap of the extant literature. 
(2) Welfare Analysis and Land Rent Allocation 
This study can be further extended to analyze the alternative schemes of land 
rent allocation to indicate the welfare effect. 
In an open economy with both capital and labor freely mobile, the product 
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market is perfectly competitive, where both the firms and builders will receive 
-zero economic profit at equilibrium. Hence, the differential housing price 
reflects the resource cost of the scarcity input which refers to land input. The 
land market is monopolistic in China, therefore, although the land supply 
would adjust to equalize the equilibrium land rent cross sectors when the land 
market was perfect competitive, there remains the differential land rents cross 
sectors. 
The welfare of the economy is determined by the land rent allocation in an 
open economy. Following the logic from Glaeser(2012), this study considers 
the land rent allocation under the two alternative allocation schemes to provide 
insights on the land management system reform in China. Given that the initial 
non-traded sector’s land rent belongs to the old residents, the two allocation 
schemes with respect to the non-traded incremental land rent can be 
investigated: first, the non-traded incremental land rent belongs to local 
government, which is included in the local fiscal revenue used for public 
goods provision; second, the non-traded incremental land rent is equally 
shared among all residents, which is included in the resident’s income for 
private goods consumption. It can compare the aggregate land rent under the 
alternative allocation scheme to examine the welfare effect. If under the 
scheme of the non-traded incremental land rent accrued to the government, the 
aggregate land rent is higher than that under the alternative scheme, then it 
would imply the current land rent allocation system may be more efficient, 
vice versa. 
The land management system reform is another critical issue in China, which 
however few studies have been rigorously conducted. The findings of this 
study will provide important policy implications. 
(3) Efficient Multi-public Goods Financing in A Spatial 
Equilibrium Model 
The efficient financing of multiple-public goods can be examined in an 
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endogenous balanced budget framework of spatial equilibrium. 
The conventional efficient pricing of public goods is often based on Lindahl 
equation, which argues that an efficient pricing of a public good should be 
based on the marginal benefit of the public good equal to the marginal cost. 
For a public service, if government charges the head tax equal to the marginal 
utility of the public service, then the supply of the public service would be 
anticipated to be at the optimal situation; for public capital, if the marginal 
product of the public input equals its supply cost, then, the optimal supply can 
be met. However, this approach may not work in an endogenous spatial model, 
when both the tax revenue and expenditures are endogenous, as the marginal 
benefit of the public service cannot be measured only by the marginal utility 
of the individuals, which affects the production indirectly, similar reasoning 
for public capital. This endogenous balanced budget pricing analysis in a 
spatial model, particularly with the endogenous prices and city size, has 
received less attention. 
(4) Others 
Our framework can be utilized to examine other issues. First, the model is 
ready to investigate the impacts of natural amenities on the public goods 
choice. The public service expenditure is affected by the quality of the natural 
amenity. It is anticipated that cities with better natural amenity endowments 
will tend to spend have more incentive for public service provision, as the 
opportunity cost will be smaller. 
Second, one can further investigate the different response of heterogeneous 
cities to property tax reform. Our study provides a preliminary attempt on the 
examination of the different types of cities with respect to the capital intensity, 
public capital factor share and household preferences numerically. Further 
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Appendix A The Marginal Tax Effect 
of VAT on Traded Goods Output 







 in Eq.(4.5) , the 
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Appendix B Calculation of Marginal 
Effect of Each Public Good on Local 
Government’s Utility 
The marginal utility of public capital
TZ :  
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The marginal utility of public capital ZH :  
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The marginal utility of urban amenities : 
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Therefore, the elasticity of substitution between public capital and public 
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Appendix C China’s Fiscal System 
C1. Background of China’s Fiscal Reforms 
After the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949, it gradually 
reformed its tax regime to accommodate the transformation of its economy to 
socialist. The socialist transformation was undergone gradually from 1949 to 
1956. Between 1949 and 1952, the economy was mixed with public and 
private economies; therefore, in order to suit the multi-ownership system, 
many categories of taxes were imposed on goods and services and on personal 
incomes and several local taxes were classified. Taxes on goods and services 
are similar to the turnover tax
22
. Local taxes at this time included the Stamp 
Tax, Inheritance Tax, Transaction Tax, Slaughter Tax, House Tax, Land Tax, 
Specific Consumption Tax, and Vehicles and Vessel License Tax. As the 
economy recovered rapidly from the wars that occurred prior to its 
establishment
23
, fiscal revenues from industrial and commercial taxes were 
doubled in 2 years. The most important taxes during this period were the taxes 
on goods and services (turnover tax). 
Between 1953 and 1957, the socialist reconstruction was initiated to 
nationalize the capitalist industrial and commercial enterprises and collectivize 
small businesses and agriculture. By 1956, the socialist transformation had 
been almost completed, leaving a very small portion of private economy with 
most of the socialist economy. The tax revenue from the socialist sector 
increased from 57 percent of total tax revenue in 1956 to 96.7 percent in 1957. 
                                                             
22 Taxes on goods and services included Commodity Tax, Industrial and Commercial 
Business Tax, Salt Tax, and Customs Duties. Industrial and Commercial Business Tax 
includes business income tax, a turnover tax, and a number of less important taxes 
such as the commercial license tax and the street traders tax. Taxes on personal 
incomes include Wages and Salaries Income Tax and Interest Income Tax, but Wages 
and Salaries Income Tax was initiated in 1980. Jinyan Li(1991),”Taxation in the 
People’s Republic of China”, New York, Westport. 
23




The whole economy was highly controlled by the central government. During 
1958 to 1978, the “leftist”24 simplified the previous complicated tax system 
several times until it finally had only one single tax with equal tax rate for all 
enterprises in the same industry: the Industrial and Commercial Tax (ICT)
25
. 
Therefore, the only tax of any importance was also a form of turnover tax. 
During the period between 1949 and 1978, China was a highly 
centralized-planning economy. The state controlled almost all major economic 
activities throughout the state-own enterprises (SOEs). Central government 
obtained full surplus from the SOEs. Taxation was utilized as an instrument 
for transferring part of the profit from state enterprises to tax offices, 
mobilizing resources within the public sector. This is different from many 
western countries where taxation was used instead as a policy instrument for 
distributing resources from the private sector to the public sector. The local 
government acts as an agent of the central government for carrying out the 
central policies without fiscal autonomy. 
Until the end of 1978, the “open economy” reform called for a fundamental 
fiscal reform, as the economy was open up to foreign enterprises, and the 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) and the private enterprises were 
burgeoned. Therefore, in order to accommodate the multiple ownerships of 
enterprises in the economy, several reforms were initiated consecutively from 
1979 to 1988. These reforms were known as “eating from separate kitchen”, 
referring to the division of the central and local expenditures and revenues. 
The reforms culminated in a “fiscal contracting system” reform in 1988 which 
was one of the most significant fiscal reforms in China. 
                                                             
24
 The “leftist” theory suggested that the socialism needs no taxation. 
25
 State enterprises were only subject to the Industrial and Commercial Tax on the 
turnovers, while some provinces would impose Industrial and Commercial Income 




C2. “Fiscal Contracting System” Reform in 
1980s 
As the open economy reform started, income tax law was promulgated in 1980 
for foreign and private enterprises. Facing competitions from non-state 
enterprises, the state enterprises initiated “tax for profit” reforms aiming to 
increase their productivities. The “tax for profit” reform was gradually 
implemented. It was firstly experimented in the early 1979 to allow the state 
enterprises to retain part of the profits to expand the production and reward 
their workers. This experiment had great successes as the enterprises that 
undergone the experiment had experienced a growth rate of 3 to 4 times 
greater than those that had not undertaken the experiment. Later, the reform 
substituted the profit remittance with income tax in 1983, but part of the 
after-income-tax profits were still needed to submit to the state. Since the 
product price and natural resource allocation and capital investment were 
highly controlled by the central government, this reform did not provide much 
incentive for the state enterprises to increase their productivity. Therefore, in 
1984, an additional reform permitted SOEs to retain the after-income-tax 
profits. In addition, as the TVEs and private enterprises developed, the income 
taxes designated for these enterprises were also promulgated. 
After “tax for profit” reforms on state enterprises, profits varied enormously 
across state enterprises due to the differences in initial capital investment, 
access to natural resources, and the locations of the markets, which 
undermined the fair competition in a market economy. Hence, multiple taxes 
had to be introduced to regulate the profit levels. In 1984, a turnover tax 
reform was initiated, which replaced the uniform ICT with four types of taxes 
including the Product Tax, Value-added Tax (VAT), Business Tax and Salt Tax. 
These taxes were imposed on domestic goods and services. The Consolidated 
Industrial and Commercial Tax (CICT) 
26
was unfolded from ICT to levy on 
foreign goods and services. 
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Meanwhile, significant reforms on the land use system were initiated, which is 
associated with the economic reform after 1978. Land use was allocated by the 
central government during the planning period between 1949 and 1978 and its 
use was free of charges. In 1979, as foreign enterprises were entering China’s 
market, land was utilized by the government as a collateral investment for 
establishing joint-venture enterprises. Later in 1982, the land use tax was 
firstly charged by Shenzhen, which facilitated the Land Use Tax to be 
stipulated in local tax revenue in 1985. A detailed tax assignment stipulated in 
the regulation on fiscal system was issued in 1985
27
 (Table C2.1). 
Table C2.1 Tax structure in 1985 
Center taxes 
Taxes on goods 
and services 
⑴Product Tax, VAT and Business Tax collected by customs on 
goods imported and exported; 
⑵Business Tax on enterprises under Ministry of Railways, 
banks and insurance companies, enterprises producing 
petroleum, electricity, petroleum chemical and nonferrous 
metals; 
⑶Special Oil Burning Tax; 
⑷Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax on foreign 
enterprises engaged in offshore oil exploration; 
⑸Customs Duties. 
Income Tax 
⑴State Enterprises Income Tax under central control; 
⑵State Enterprises Income Regulatory Tax under central 
control; 




⑴State Enterprises Income Tax under local control; 
⑵State Enterprises Income Regulatory Tax under local control; 
⑶Collective Enterprises Income Tax. 
Property-type Tax 
⑴Urban Real Estate Tax; 
⑵Land Use Tax; 
⑶Real Estate Tax(Housing Tax); 
                                                             
27
 “Regulations on Implementing a Fiscal Management System of Classifying Taxes, 
Certifying Revenue and Expenditures and Each Level of Government Being 




⑷Vehicle and Vessel License Tax; 




⑵Livestock Transaction Tax; 
⑶Market Transaction Tax; 
⑷Agricultural Tax; 
⑸Animal Husbandry Tax; 
⑹Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax. 
Shared Taxes 
Taxes on goods 
and services 
⑴Product Tax, VAT, Business Tax, except those allocated to 
central revenues exclusively; 
⑵Salt Tax; 
⑶Consolidate Industrial and Commercial Tax on foreign 
enterprises except those engaged in offshore oil exploration. 
Income Tax 
⑴Income Tax on foreign enterprises, except those engaged in 
offshore oil exploration; 
⑵State Enterprises Bonus Tax; 
⑶Individual Income Tax. 
Property-type Tax Resource Tax. 
Others Construction Tax. 
Central taxes included the Product Tax, both the VAT and Business Tax 
collected by customs on goods imported and exported; the Business Tax on 
enterprises under the Ministry of Railways, banks and insurance companies, 
enterprises producing petroleum, electricity, petroleum chemical and 
nonferrous metals; the Special Oil Burning Tax; the CICT and the Income Tax 
on foreign enterprises engaged in offshore oil exploration; the Customs Duties; 
the State Enterprises Income Tax and Income Regulatory Tax on state 
enterprises under central control. 
Local taxes were defined in terms of retaining all tax revenues at the local 
level
29
. Local taxes included the State Enterprises Income Tax and Income 
Regulatory Tax on state enterprises under the local control; the Collective 
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Enterprises Income Tax; the Urban Real Estate Tax; the Real Estate Tax; the 
Land Use Tax; the Vehicle and Vessel Use Tax; the Vehicle and Vessel License 
Tax; the Contract Tax; the Slaughter Tax; the Livestock Transaction Tax; the 
Market Transaction Tax; the Agricultural Tax; the Animal Husbandry Tax; the 
Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax (UMCT). Among those local taxes, 
the Land Use Tax, Real Estate Tax and Vehicle and Vessel Use Tax were not 
enacted immediately after the implementation of this regulation, but later in 
1988, 1986 and late 1985, separately. In addition, the Banquet Tax and the 
Stamp Tax were later introduced as a local tax source in 1988. 
Shared taxes included the Product Tax, VAT, and Business Tax (except those 
exclusively allocated to central revenues); the Salt Tax; the CICT and the 
Income Tax on foreign enterprises except those engaged in offshore oil 
exploration; the State Enterprises Bonus Tax; the Individual Income Tax; the 
Resource Tax; the Construction Tax. 
C.2.1 The Turnover Taxes 
The major turnover taxes before 1988 included the Product Tax, VAT, 
Business Tax, Salt Tax, Special Oil Burning Tax and CICT. 
The Product Tax was levied on industrial product during the manufacturing 
and import stage and on the agricultural products during the purchases. It was 
exerted on 270 different types of products with 26 differential tax rates. It was 
the most important tax revenue source at the time. The VAT was levied on 
some selected products that had been subjected to serious cumulative taxation 
under ICT. The categories of taxable goods were increased from the original 2 
to 24 by 1988. The Business Tax was similar to the Product Tax, which 
however was levied on services and trades. The collective and private 
enterprises were the major tax payers. The Salt Tax was an excise tax that 




excise tax on oil consumption
30
. The CICT was levied on foreign enterprises. 
In 1985, the turnover tax contributed to the total tax revenue at 46.72 percent, 
while the ratio was increased to 52.84 percent in 1988
31
. At the local level, 
from Table C2.1, it seems that there were fewer turnover taxes exclusively 
belonging to local tax sources, which were mainly in the form of shared taxes 
to contribute to the local tax revenue. The shared tax revenue, retained by the 
local government was based on negotiation between the central and local 
governments. 
The central-local revenue sharing scheme had involved 3 categories. In 1980, 
the revenue sharing scheme was based on a formula that identified the share as 
the ratio of fiscal expenditure to the revenue at the base year of 1979 with the 
fiscal surplus shared at that ratio between central and local, while the fiscal 
deficits would receive transfers from the central. This sharing scheme is called 
“proportional sharing system”. In 1985, the central local revenue sharing 
scheme was adjusted to the new tax assignments. Local and shared tax 
revenues were shared among central and local, except the central exclusive 
taxes, at the proportional rate that was determined by local expenditure to 
revenue. In 1988, the “fiscal contracting system” delinked the tax revenue and 
expenditure relationship to submit a fixed number of revenue to central. The 
local government’s role was shifted from providing local public service to 
financing public expenditure. 
This shared scheme provided the local government with greater rooms to 
“game” with the central government and finally had managed to retain most of 
them at the local level. 
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 The purpose of levying this tax is to limit the consumption of the oil in order to 
encourage its use for production. 
31





C.2.2 The Property-type Taxes 
The major property-type taxes that related to real estate by 1988 were the 
Urban Real Estate Tax, Land Use Tax and Real Estate Tax.  
The Urban Real Estate Tax was levied on foreign enterprises and individuals. 
Land Use Tax included the Farmland Use Tax and Urban Land Use Tax. Both 
taxes were levied on users for using lands (Farmland Use Tax is for using 
agricultural land as non-agricultural activities) based on areas subject to 
various rates depending on location. Real Estate Tax was levied on domestic 
individuals, work units, enterprises who owned housing property. 
Table C2.1 shows that the property-type taxes were merely found as 
exclusively central tax sources, but mainly as local taxes; however, they 
played a very limited role in local tax revenue. This observation was important, 
as it then provided rooms for the local government to shift to “land financing”. 
C.2.3 Expenditure Responsibility 
Along with the revenue sharing in 1985, the expenditure responsibilities were 
greatly decentralized. The State Council Supplementary Regulations on the 
Implementation of the “Tax Assignment System” had a broad assignment of 
central and local government expenditure responsibilities. The central 
government’s responsibility was mainly focused on national defense, 
economic development, and the administration of national institutions. More 
specifically, these include the national defense, administrations, management 
of central SOEs, capital spending, the technical renovation of central 
enterprises and new product development, geological survey, agricultural 
supports, universities, and research institutes.  
The local governments are responsible for social security and safety, local 
public service provisions, local economic developments, and local institution 




unemployment insurance, poverty alleviation, price subsidies; primary and 
secondary schooling, large portion of higher education, health care and 
hospitals, cultural and heritage protection, environmental protection; 
management of local SOEs, local capital investment, the technical renovation 
of local enterprises and new product development, agricultural supports, urban 
maintenance and construction, local and regional roads, highways, waste water 
collection and treatment, garbage collection and disposal, urban gas supply, 
and mass transit; and administration. 
There is no explicit classification of the expenditure items into investment and 
recurrent expenditures. The following Table C.2.3.1regrouped these items into 
capital investment for economic development, housing service investment, 
public service and others.  




⑴capital spending; R&D; 






⑵universities and research institutes; 
⑶hospitals. 




⑴management of local SOEs;  
⑵local capital investment; 
⑶the technical renovation of local enterprises and new 
product development; 
⑷agricultural supports; 
⑸urban maintenance and construction; 







⑵Local infrastructures: water supply and distribution; waste 
water collection and treatment; garbage collection and 
disposal; urban gas supply; mass transit; 
⑶local roads. 
Public service 




⑸primary and secondary school; 
⑹healthcare; 
⑺cultural and heritage protection; 
⑻environmental protection. 
Others Administration of local institutions. 
The most important unit of local government for the local public service 
provision in China is at the county level in most provinces. The county spent 
about 70 percent of the total sub-provincial education expenditures and 55 to 
60 percent of the health expenditure. Comparing with many other countries, 
the education and healthcare are usually the responsibilities of the provincial 
or central governments. In addition, prefectural and county level governments 
in China are responsible for the unemployment insurance, social security, and 
welfare, which are generally the federal government’s responsibilities in many 
other countries. 
Local expenditure share after 1988 when the “fiscal contacting system” reform 
culminated increases dramatically to nearly 70 percent of total expenditure 





Source: China Financial Yearbook 1953-2010 
Figure C.2.3.1 Central-local expenditure share 
C.2.4 Issues with the “Fiscal Contracting System” 
These reforms separated the central and local tax sources, which were often 
known as “eating from separate kitchen”. Under this tax system, despite the 
local governments being assigned with several local tax sources exclusively, 
there were little tax autonomy, given that the tax bases and tax rates were 
designed by the central government. Local tax laws were promulgated by the 
central government; the local government can introduce the implementing 
rules and grant the tax deduction and exemption with respect to the local taxes. 
In addition, local governments were responsible for most tax collections 
including those of central taxes. Hence, despite having no formal taxation 
autonomy at the local level, the authority in collecting almost all taxes and 
granting tax deduction and exemption provided them a certain degree of 
capability to “game” with the central government. Moreover, the local 


































































































Central-Local Exependiture Share 




enterprises. They were motivated to reduce efforts in collecting VAT in order 
to leave the profits from those accrued to the local revenue. 
The local government was able to avoid the shared taxes by reducing their 
taxing efforts. As a result, the central fiscal revenue share decreased for 5 
consecutive years from 1985 to 1989 (Figure C.2.4.1), while local fiscal 
revenue share increased, during the worst cases, the central government 
borrowed from the local governments
32
. In addition, the fiscal revenue to GDP 
decreased from 22.23 percent in 1985 to 15.68 percent in 1989.  
It was observed that during 1984 to 1988, there was increasing “investment 
hunger” at the local level: total capital investment increased at 20 percent 
annually, of which the state-owned enterprises increased at 18.94 percent 
while the collective-owned enterprises increased at 35.8 percent. The 
collective-owned enterprises are mainly owned by local governments. The 
increase in local capital investment could be driven by the aim of increasing 
profits that were retained for local enterprises for investments and other uses. 
The budgeting process followed the bottom-up-down procedure. The local 
government firstly reports on the budget plan to the central government, who 
then summarizes all plans and then makes a final plan, which then is 
distributed to the provincial governments. The provincial government then 
assigns the targets to the lower level of governments. The accomplishment of 
the targeted budget was used as a valuation for the local officials. Therefore, 
this fiscal decentralization was primarily administrative decentralization with a 
highly centralized political system. 
There are flaws with the tax structure in this tax system. Firstly, the Product 
Tax, VAT and Business Tax have similar functions although different tax bases. 
Secondly, the limited local tax revenue capacity was unable to meet the 
expenditure needs, which induced the local government to abuse fees and 
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 Central government borrowed from local government through setting up two funds: 
one is “pivotal national energy and transportation construction fund ” in 1982 and 






Source: China Financial Yearbook 1953-2010 
Figure C.2.4.1 Central-local tax revenues 
C3. “Tax Assignment System” Reform in 1994 
Facing the problem of decreasing ratios from both central to total revenue and 
fiscal revenue to GDP in the 1980s, the “tax assignment system” reform was 
initiated in 1994, which was another critical fiscal reform in China. A major 
reform was extending the VAT to all turnovers and eliminating the product and 
business tax on many industrial products. Other reforms included (i) unifying 
the income taxes on domestic enterprises with different ownerships and 
individuals separately. For example, both the local and central State 
Enterprises Income Tax and Income Regulatory Tax, the Collective 
Enterprises Income Tax, and the Private Enterprises Income Tax were unified 
into the Enterprises Income Tax; the Individual Income Tax and the Bonus Tax 



































































































Central-Local Tax Revenue Share 




Burning Tax, Market Transaction Tax, and Livestock Transaction Tax; (iii) the 
Slaughter Tax, Banquet Tax, and Animal Husbandry Tax were decentralized to 
be exclusively local taxes and the local government were offered the authority 
to determine whether to terminate the former two taxes at their own 
jurisdiction. These reforms simplified the tax structure and resolved some of 
the problems of the duplicate taxation on some goods. For the detailed tax 
assignment for this “tax assignment system”, please refer to Table C3.1. 
Table C3.1 Tax Structure in 1994 
Center taxes 
Taxes on goods 
and services 
⑴VAT and Consumption Tax collected by customs on goods 
imported and exported; 
⑵Business Tax on enterprises under Ministry of Railways, banks 
and insurance companies, enterprises producing petroleum, 




⑴Income Tax on state enterprises under central control; 
⑵Income Tax on foreign enterprises engaged in offshore oil 
exploration. 
Others 
⑴Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax on enterprises under 
Ministry of Railways, banks and insurance companies, enterprises 
producing petroleum, electricity, petroleum chemical and 
nonferrous metals. 
Local Taxes 
Taxes on goods 
and services 
Business Tax on enterprises, except those enterprises of Railways, 
banks and nonbank financial institutions, insurance companies. 
Income Tax Income Tax on state and collective enterprises under local control. 
Property-type 
Tax 
⑴Urban Real Estate Tax; 
⑵Land Use Tax; 
⑶Real Estate Tax; 
⑷Land Value Incremental Tax; 
⑸Fixed Asset Adjustment Tax; 
⑹Vehicle and Vessel Use Tax; 







⑵Livestock Transaction Tax; 
⑶Market Transaction Tax; 
⑷Agricultural Tax; 
⑸Animal Husbandry Tax; 
⑹Banquet Tax; 
⑺Stamp Tax; 
⑻Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax except those 
allocated to central revenues exclusively. 
Shared Taxes 
Taxes on goods 
and services 
⑴VAT, except those allocated to central revenues 
exclusively(central to local: 3:1); 




The “tax sharing system” specified the central tax sources33 including import 
tariffs, consumption taxes, income taxes, import-related consumption taxes 
and VATs, business, company income, and UMCTs on banks, nonbank 
financial institutions and insurance companies, and taxes on railroads. Except 
for the UMCT that is added, much is similar to the central taxes as the “fiscal 
contracting system”. 
Local tax sources include income taxes, business, company income, and urban 
maintenance and development taxes on businesses excluding banks, nonbank 
financial institutions and insurance companies and railroads, personal income 
tax, urban land use tax, fixed assets capital gains tax, house property taxes, 
stamp taxes, agriculture and related taxes, tax on contracts, and land value 
incremental taxes. Relative to the “fiscal contracting system”, local tax 
resources are added with the Land Value Incremental Tax and Fixed Asset 
Adjustment Tax. UMCT is shared among central and local. 
Sharing tax sources include value added taxes, stamp taxes on security 
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 Central fiscal revenue includes profits of SOEs under the jurisdiction of the 
central government and local fiscal revenue includes profits of SOEs under the 




exchange, and resource taxes. Value-added tax shared among central and local 
with 3:1. The share of the Stamp and Security Tax was changed to be 88:12 for 
central to local. 
In addition, the tax collection bureau was divided into central and local tax 
revenues. Central tax bureau collected central exclusive taxes and shared taxes 
while local tax bureau collected local taxes. 
C.3.1 The Turnover Tax 
In 1993, the Consumption Tax was initiated to levy on particular products such 
as wine, cigarette, etc., in the course of their productions, which was similar to 
the excise tax. The Product Tax was folded into the VAT and Consumption Tax. 
The Salt Tax was separated into the VAT and Resource Tax. By 1994, the 
turnover tax consists mainly of the VAT, Consumption Tax, and Business Tax. 
The Consumption Tax was as an exclusive central tax, Business Tax sources 
were divided for central and local exclusive taxes
34
, and VAT was a sharing tax 
between central and local at 3:1. These 4 types of turnover taxes continue to 
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 Business Tax on banks, nonbank financial institutions and insurance companies and 
railroads were exclusive central tax, others were local tax.  
35
 The central turnover tax in the figure included the VAT, Business Tax, 
Consumption Tax, and Product Tax (before 1994). The local turnover tax in the figure 





Source: author self-complied from China Financial Year Book 
Figure C.3.1.1 Turnover tax revenue during 1991-2009 
Figure C.3.1.1 shows the turnover tax shared between central and local. It 
shows that the total turnover tax to GDP has a relatively stable share cross 
times. However, the share of central and local turnover tax has dramatically 
overturned after 1993 when the “tax sharing system” was implemented. The 
central turnover tax share has increased with more than half of the total tax 
revenue. Correspondingly local turnover tax share decreased with more than 
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Source: author self-complied from China Financial Year Book 1994-2010 
Figure C.3.1.2 Local tax revenue composition 
Figure C.3.1.2 shows the composition of the local tax revenues. It shows that 
the VAT and the Business Tax (together compose the broad definition of the 
VAT) played a critical role in local tax revenue. The significant role of the 
turnover tax is far beyond this, after accounting for the tax rebates. 
The “tax rebate” system was initiated in 1993 for the purpose of obtaining 
support of the local government toward the “tax assignment system” reform. 
The central government committed to return a portion of VAT revenue from 
the central-shared to the local government to maintain their previous 
expenditures as in 1993. In addition, the central government also committed to 
return 30 percent of the incremental VAT and the Consumption Tax to the local 
government in order to prevent the avoidance of the taxing efforts. This “tax 
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C.3.2 The Property-type Tax 
The major local property-type taxes are similar as before, which include the 
Urban Real Estate Tax, Land Use Tax, and Real Estate Tax. The Fixed Asset 
Adjustment Tax was abolished in 2000. The Vehicle and Vessel License Tax 
and Vehicle and Vessel Use Tax were combined as the Vehicle and Vessel Tax. 




Figure C.3.1.2 also shows that the property-type tax consists of a small portion 
of the local tax revenue. The major property-type taxes have smaller tax bases 
in addition to the lower tax rates. For the Urban Real Estate Tax, the tax rate is 
1.2 percent of the real estate value or 1.8 percent of the rental of the real estate. 
For the Real Estate Tax, the levies are 1.2 percent tax rate on the value of the 
housing property or 12 percent tax rate based on the rental income of the 
housing property. The non-business properties are exempted for this tax. The 
Land Use Tax is levied based on land area at a rate ranging from 1-10 yuan/m
2
 
for Farmland Use Tax and 0.3-10 yuan/m
2
 for Urban Land Use Tax. 
Therefore, the smaller contribution of the property-type taxes to local tax 
revenues is accounted for by the lower tax rates and the smaller tax bases, 
which excludes the residential properties. The property-type tax makes up 
lower than 10 percent of local tax revenue. Compared with property tax in 
other countries, the developed countries usually have property tax consists of a 
large portion. For example, in the United States 80 percent, Canada 84.5 
percent, British 93 percent, and Australia 99.6 percent, while some Asian 
countries usually have property tax consisted of around 23 percent-54 
percent
37
. Hence, China’s local tax system has much smaller property tax 
revenue. There are many rooms for local government to increase local tax 
revenue by imposing property tax. 
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 The Tonnage Duty existed before 1985, but it was designated to the Ministry of 
Transportation in 1986, and later in 2001, it was resumed to be administered by the 







C.3.3 Expenditure Responsibilities 
The expenditure assignment inherited from the “fiscal contracting system” has 
little amendments. Local expenditure was increased from 70 percent of total 
expenditures in 1994 to 80 percent in 2009 (Figure C.2.3.1). Figure C.3.3.1 
shows the local expenditure components after the “tax sharing system” reform. 
 
Source: author self-complied from China Financial Year Book 1992-2006 
Figure C.3.3.1 Local expenditure composition 
Note: 
In 1994-1995, the reduction of public service expenditure share was mainly caused by 
the 1994 “tax assignment reform”. The public service expenditure reductions in 
1997-1999 and 2003-2005 were caused by the two “land enclosure” movements, 
because local government tended to spend more public capitals to increase the land 
value. 
Figure C.3.3.1 shows that local expensed more than 60 percent of fiscal 
revenues on capital construction, including capital construction, urban 
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1994-1995, 1997-1999 and 2003-2005, the public service expenditure share 
was reduced remarkably. In 1994-1995, the reduction of public service 
expenditure share was mainly caused by the 1994 “tax assignment reform,” 
which implies that the fiscal reform contributed to the distortion of local 
government expenditures. While, on the other hand, the reductions in 
1997-1999 and 2003-2005 were consistent with the two “land enclosure” 
movements that happened in China
38
, which indicates that local government 
spent more on capital investment to increase the land rents 
C.3.4  Issues with the “Tax Assignment System” 
The tax system clearly assigned the central-local shared ratio on the shared tax 
revenues, in addition to the specification of the central and local exclusive tax 
sources. This tax system simplified the tax categories and tax rates, and 
controlled local government’s authority in tax exemptions and deductions. 
Similar as before, the weakness of the tax system has the overlapping function 
of the VAT and the Business Tax, which has been remedied by the 
initialization of turnover tax reform by incorporating the Business Tax into 
VAT recently. Another weakness of this tax system that similar to the “fiscal 
contracting system” is the small role of property-type taxes in local tax 
revenue. 
In addition, the VAT adopted in China is a production-type VAT while the 
consumption-type VAT is often applied worldwide. There are three types of 
VAT utilized in practice worldwide depending on how to treat the capital 
investment in the tax base: the production-type VAT (or GNP-type VAT), 
income-type VAT, and consumption-type VAT. The taxable base of 
production-type VAT is the sales revenue deducting the value of intermediate 
product. The taxable base of income-type VAT is the sales revenue subtracting 
the depreciation of fixed assets and the intermediate product. The taxable base 
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 The reduction of public service expenditure in 2000-2001 was due to the fiscal 




of consumption-type VAT is the sales revenue deducting the gross value of 
fixed assets purchased during the period in addition to depreciation of the 
fixed assets and the intermediate product. 
The production-type VAT allows neither any deduction of the capital 
investment nor depreciation of the capital which discourages private capital 
investments. Relative to the income-type VAT and consumption-type VAT, 
production-type VAT has the largest tax base since private capital investments 
are included in the tax base. Hence, after the fiscal revenue decrease with the 
1980’s ‘fiscal contracting system’ reform, the production-type VAT was 
adopted, which is more advantageous than the other two in increasing the 
fiscal revenue. 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Chinese Investment in Fixed Assets 
Figure C.3.4.1 Public vs. private capital investment during 1980-2001 
Figure C.3.4.1 shows that despite an increase of private capital investment 
after 1990 as a result of adopting production-type VAT, the public capital 



























































































































Public and Private Capital Investment 




policy makers are considering to further reform the production-type VAT 
toward the consumption-type VAT to increase more private capital investment 
rather than public capital investment. 
C4. Summary 
China’s tax system has evolved from a “fiscal contracting system” to “tax 
assignment system,” which has greatly decentralized the fiscal sources to the 
local government as well as the expenditure responsibility. The current tax 
revenue system is dominated by VAT, where the local property tax plays a 
small role in local revenue generation. The “tax rebate” system with the 
VAT-dominated revenue system promotes the local government’s incentive for 
local economic development, which distorts local expenditure choices toward 
favoring capital investment to public service provision. Moreover, the 
increasing local expenditures in excess of the local tax revenues have induced 
the local government to rely on “land financing” due to the lacking fiscal 
autonomy in setting local taxes, which was an extra-budgetary revenue. The 
reliance on “land financing” further enhanced the local government’s incentive 
for public capital investment rather than public service provision. 
 
